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ABSTRACT

This is a dissertation on the evolution of
maritime activities in the Republic of Panama and
on the possibilities of increasing the benefits that
the country derives from them during the period 19862000 and beyond.

It has been written to allow Pana

manians to take a look at their national maritime
history and institutions, and to try to lend them
the intellectual tools for devising ways in which
to foster the growth of these activities in the coun
try.
In the document we present a very strict
conceptual framework, that is, that this disserta
tion has been written within the context of the Uni
ted Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea,1982
and the Panamanian Government's current economic and
social development strategy.

The body of the disser

tation itself is composed of three parts, although
these are not identified as such, which are: Panama's
maritime background, the Strategy for National Mari
time Development that lies at the heart of this ef
fort, and a description of the current situation and
perspectives of each one of the major components of
the national maritime sector, as we have defined it
herein.
With this dissertation we wish to underscore
the fact that Panama is a Maritime Nation and that,
despite the haphazard way in which its maritime act-
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ivities seem to have developed, through a correct
application of remedies,- including extensive train
ing of marine personnel, reinforcement of infrastruc
tures, and a strengthening of the "healthy climate"
for investments in maritime affairs -- Panama will
be able to achieve its full maritime development by
the target year 2000.

The achievement of strategic

goals outlined as part of our Strategy, moreover,
should pave the way for Panama to make the best use
possible of its number one natural resource, its
unique geographical position and configuration, for
improving the standard of living of its people and
for supporting the diversification of the national
economic structure into other export-oriented areas
of human endeavour.
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INTRODUCTION

The Republic of Panama is a small developing
country located between 77° and 83° W and 7° and 10°N,
approximately in the middle of the American continent.
(See Figure 1). To most people perhaps it is just one
of the Central American "banana" republics. To traders
and shipping people, however, Panama is one of the
great crossroads of the world, an S-shaped isthmus 80
kilometers at its narrowest and 193 at its widest that
has facilitated trade over centuries.
In a world increasingly characterized by the
awareness of nations of the importance of maritime af
fairs for their economic and social development, as
well as by their just demands to gain greater parti
cipation in such affairs, an analysis of maritime de
velopments in the Republic of Panama is not only appro
priate but necessary. As the country with the world's
second largest merchant fleet under its flag, Panama's
handling of its open registry is constantly scrutinize
not to say attacked, by a variety of interests. As the
country that hosts one of the world's three major interoceanic waterways, the Panama Canal, Panama is also
the target of attention and concern. Yet despite the
apparent acknowledgement of its importance for world
trade and development, an understanding of the reasons
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Fig. 1. Panama's Geographical Location
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why this small Third World nation commands such a key
role seems to escape even the most learned of shipping
men.
Panama 2000; A Strategy for National Maritime
Development is a dissertation on the evolution of Pa
namanian maritime activities and on the possibility
of increasing the benefits they generate over the next
fifteen years. We have written it to allow Panamanians
to take a necessary look into their own maritime deve
lopment in a historical perspective, and to lend them
the intellectual tools for analyzing the present and
for planning the future. With this work we hope to pave
the way for an increase in the economic activity that
accompanies growth in the maritime sector, and to see
the country steadily develop into a full maritime nation
by the year 2000.
On the basis of our stated goal, we have struct
ured the body of this dissertation around three basic
levels of analysis: a chronology of the evolution of
maritime activities in the Republic of Panama; a description of the National Maritime Development Strategy
that lies at the heart of this dissertation; and a com
prehensive overview of the national maritime sector,
including present structures and development trends,
as well as our ideas on how the country can work to
improve thesector 's present economic performance by
implementing the strategy we propose.
Following this Introduction, the reader will
find, first, a chapter discussing Panama's maritime
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background. We then proceed to introduce our strategy
for national maritime development in the Republic of
Panama; we do this by first giving a comprehensive
overview of the economic and social performance indi
cators of the national maritime sector as a whole,
before detailing the set of goals that we have used
here to define our strategy. The latter are listed
individually and can be said to usually apply to one
of the components of the national maritime sector, al
though there is some overlapping in the goals because
of the intrinsic interrelatedness of maritime affairs.
The following chapters deal at some length
with the different maritime activities that are carried
out in the Republic of Panama. The chapters are generally
divided into a description of the present situation and
a look into how the strategic goal(s) defined for the
specific activity can be put into practice. In this way
we discuss Human Resources, The Open Registry Fleet,
The National Ports, National Maritime Ancillary Indus
tries, The Panama Canal and Fishing.
In dealing with subject matter we have outlined
in the preceding paragraphs, we have obviously strived
to adhere to the objectivity that must characterize all
research papers such as this one. Our work has been af
fected, nevertheless, by the general lack of hard facts,
especially as regards the economic and social perform
ance of the different activities and industries, and by
the virtually total absence of publicly-available govern
ment policy statements regarding' our topic.
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Another limitation we must signal here refers
to the conceptual framework under which we have produced
this dissertation. This has not been an exercise in
free-thinking, but rather an attempt to make develop
ments in Panamanian maritime affairs begin to fall into
a more coherent, formal pattern.

We believe this is

the only way to approach development in any field, and
that this focusing on goals and concepts, and on longrange planning as per internationally-accepted standards
is the best step forward.
As a consequence of the above, after much re
search and consultation with experts in the field, we
decided to give our strategy the overall framework of
both the United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea, 1982 (better known as UNCLOS III) and on the Na
tional Development Strategy being implemented by the
Panamanian Government. As far as UNCLOS III is concern
ed, we feel it should provide the guidelines for dev
eloping not only shipping, but all maritime affairs in
the Republic of Panama, despite the fact that it is an
instrument not yet in force. This convention represents,
in our modest opinion, the umbrella legislation that
can best provide for an orderly exploitation of searelated activities for the benefit of all nations, and
its concepts are of such a valuable, universal nature
that they should be embodied in national legislations
independently of constricting political considerations.
By adhering to the essence of Panama's current
development strategy, we are basically trying to offer
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our compatriots and decision-makers the opportunity
to work within existing policies and institutions as
much as possible, to avoid major disruptions that will
benefit no one. This does not mean that we do not en
visage some changes, but these should be of a minor
character over the next fifteen years, while the ground
work for solid maritime development is being laid.

By

the year 2000, when the strategic goals we have outlined
here have been .achieved, the time will be ripe for sug
gesting and putting into practice administrative or
other reforms of a greater magnitude.
'

This dissertation, then, has been constructed

around the national economic and social development
strategy of Panama, and not as a separate or alternate
idea. We generally agree that the stated goal of improv
ing the quality of life of the Panamanian people by inc
reasing national wealth and exports via the exploitation
of new and traditional sources of revenue, by integrat
ing the country socially and regionally, by strengthen
ing its institutions, and by developing further the na
tional identity is a sound development strategy for our
country, given its particular historical and geographical
conditions.^ We believe, furthermore, that the centering
of our economy around the tertiary sector as a way of
generating the income needed to sustain our young and
fast-growing population and to obtain the seed capital
for future diversification is not only wise, but perhaps
the only alternative we have. Due to this fact, in this
document we do not touch upon the extremely controver-
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sial issues surrounding open registries, the inter
national banking and insurance centers, the Panama
Canal and other so-called factors of dependency, but
rather attempt to deal with them in a constructive
and open manner, simply assuming that discussing these
issues here would be of no avail in shortening the
gap between the different points of view and that, in
the meantime, the world.cannot stop and the Panamanian
people have a right to continue existing and prospering
to the degree that they contribute to world society.
We finally wish to mention in this introductory
section, that this dissertation must be considered only
as a preliminary attempt at understanding the complexi
ties of "Panama, a Maritime Nation".

As a pioneer work

in this field, we have only been able to briefly study
institutions and their development, but we feel that
there is ample room for further research work by Pana
manians interested in maritime affairs, especially in
the following areas: the role and potential impact of
national seafarers within the Panamanian economy; the
real costs of training for Panama's full maritime dev
elopment; the role of maritime training as an effective
means for the transfer of technology to Panama; the
optimum maritime administration setup for Panama; and
guidelines for implementation of UNCLOS III by the Re
public of Panama.

CHAPTER ONE
PANAMA'S MARITIME BACKGROUND
Although not always a major shipping nation,
the Republic of Panama does have a 500-year long trad
ition of close association with the seas, a fact that
undoubtedly allows us to state that it is a maritime
nation. From its humble origins in the small fishing
village of "Pannaba", which means "abundance of fish"
in native Indian language, Panama has developed into
a major maritime Flag and Coastal State where growth
and progress are somehow always linked to the exploi
tation of the country's main natural resource - its
geographic position and configuration - via the seas
and sea-related activities.
The Colonial Period (1501 - 1821)
The Republic of Panama wa? discovered in 1501
by the Spanish conquistador Rodrigo de Bastidas and
visited by Christopher Columbus in 1502. Since its
discovery, awareness of the strategic position and
configuration of the Panamanian isthmus began to play
a preeminent role in national development. It can be
justly argued^ that the basic features and nature of
the Panamanian economy were shaped during the early
colonial years and that it is intimately tied to the
8
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interoceanic transit zone which is, in turn, largely
determined by the three key geographical factors that
are uniquely present together in the area: the narrow
ness of the isthmus, the absence of high mountains,
and the presence of the Chagres River. These particular
features of Panama became evident early on: according
to some historians, the importance of its pass-route
was already obvious by 1513, right after the discovery
of the Pacific Ocean by Vasco Nunez de Balboa, who
first sighted these .waters from a place in the Panama
nian jungle not distant from the first mainland colony
founded by Columbus, Santa Marla de Belen.
Its singular features thus defined, Panama
soon became of vital importance to the Spanish Crown.
In fact, it has been often stated that, although it
was not a principal productive or mining area, quite
unlike other regions, Panama was the only one in the
New World that gained strategic and commercial import
ance on the sheer basis of its geography.
During the colonial period, Panama was a major
transshipment center for goods coming and going to and
from Spain and its American colonies. Passage was ef
fected through the isthmus via a combination of river
and road transport, using the Chagres River along its
navigable course. The embodiment of this role were, how
ever, the famous "Fairs of Portobelo". Portobelo, a
Caribbean port founded in 1597, hosted these renowned
trading fairs until the mid-eighteenth century: "the
Spanish galleons arrived in Portobelo loaded with wares
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that were traded for other goods coming from Ecuador,
P-feru, Chile, Bolivia and Argentina.

The fairs lasted

• forty to fifty days and goods worth many millions of
pesos were traded. 2

Furthermore, as shown in Figure 2,

port development in the Pacific and Atlantic coasts
3
of Panama was significant for the times.
A further evidence of the fact that Panama
was increasingly coming to be recognized as a major
crossroads were the constant attacks on isthmian towns
by corsairs and pirates.

Such attacks led in time to

the discontinuance of the fairs.

The attack on the

capital city of Panama, led by the English pirate Henry
Morgan in 1671, and Admiral Vernon's captures of Portobelo in 1739 and of the Fort of San Lorenzo in 1740 are
particularly sad mementos of such recognition.
The_Col^mMan_Pe r^od_(1821 - 1903)
Panama's maritime development was severely af
fected when the fairs were discontinued and Spain was
forced to abandon the route around 1746.

Activity did

not fully recover until almost a century afterwards,
but there was in the interim a political event that we
would like to mention here because of its connection
to what is Panama's destiny as a maritime nation.
Early in the eighteeenth century, with the ad
vent of the wars of liberation that led to the creation
of the new Latin American republics, Panama played a
meaningful role in support of Spain.

This situation

lasted until 1821, when the country declared its own

n
Fig.2.
Ports Movement in Panama

(1544-1812)

E M BA RCA CION ES ENTRADAS A LOS PUERTOS TERMIRALES
D E L IS T M O DE PANAMA
1544-Jai2

Source: Enciclopedia De la Cultura .Panamena para
Ninos y OSvenes 32, p.4.
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independence and, under the aegisse of the great
Latin American Liberator, Simon Bolivar, joined the
newly-formed Federation of the Great Colombia, under
the name of "Department of the Isthmus".
In 1826, there was a general meeting of Latin
American countries convened by Bolivar in Panama city.
During the Anphictionic Congress, The Liberator spoke
about Panama's uniqueness in the following terms:
"Seems that if the world were to select, its capital,
the Isthmus of Panama would be chosen for such an august
destiny, located as it is in the middle of the globe
(our translation)".

Such words, uttered by one of the

greatest Latin American statesmen of all times, would
4
forever seal the destiny of Panama and its people.
Aside from the geopolitical relevance gained
by Panama because of the political event we described
above, two other major events that took place during
the period of union with Colombia served to strengthen
Panama's maritime development: the discovery of the
gold mines of California in 1849 and the French initia
tive to build a canal through the isthmus in 1882.
In the first case, it may be said without fur
ther elaboration that Panama played a significant role
in the discovery and exploitation of the California
gold mines (1849). It became the meeting point of hun
dreds of eager European and Asian gold-diggers, the fa
mous "forty-niners"; the place for purchasing the ne
cessary supplies and equipment for prospecting; the
place, finally, to find and board one of the crowded
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ships that would take one to the lucky grounds. In this
connection, it is worth noting that Panama served the
needs of these men in an effective way. The first trans
continental railroad in the American continent was the
Trans-Isthmian Railroad of Panama, completed in 1855.
In that peak year, twenty-nine million dollars worth
of California gold was moved through the Panamanian
railroad.^
French Count Ferdinand

De Lesseps' initiative

to construct a sea-level canal throug- the isthmus of
Panama was the second maritime event of the Colombian
Period. Associated with the enterprise at its peak
growth period in 1888 were 20,000 jobs.® The ill-fated
French attempt finally collapsed in 1896, due to poor
administration, disease and great technical limitations.
Between 1896 and 1903, Panamanian economic
development was severely thwarted by the civil war bet
ween Colombia's Liberal and Conservative Parties, a
large share of which was foughton isthmian soil.

Hopes

for recovery after the 1902 peace agreement between the
two parties vanished when the Colombian Senate rejected
the draft Herran-Hay Treaty of 1903, whereby Colombia
would have granted the United States of America the
right to purchase the French concession rights and to
build a canal through Panama.

Economic depression,

awareness among Panamanians that Colombia was unable
to respond to their needs and aspirations, and pressure
by the United States to begin negotiations quickly were
the cornerstones of the Panamanian independence move-
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merit that had been slowly but steadily consolidating
itself almost since the time the country joined Co
lombia.
The Republican Period_(1903 to present)
Panama gained its independence from Colombia,
without bloodshed, on 3 November 1903.

Since then,

perhaps largely as a result of the new role that the
country came to play after the opening of the Panama
Canal to world trade, maritime development has accel
erated.

In the years that have passed since indepen

dence took place, as we shall see now, Panama has been
always actively seeking to perfect its national inde
pendence through the rational exploitation of its re
sources, especially its geographical position.

In line

with these circumstances, the Republican Period is the
period that has seen the birth of most of present-day
maritime activities in Panama, including the open reg
istry fleet, the Panama Canal, and ports and ancillary
Indus tr ies.
The Panama Canal
Negotiations between the Republic of Panama
and the United States of America over the granting of
a concession for the latter to build an interoceanic
waterway through Panama's territory were already under
way at the time of Panamanian independence from Colom
bia.

The negotiations were conducted during an espe

cially' difficult period when the country was organizing
its independent life, and that is perhaps the reason
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why they ended on an unhappy note for Panama, just
15 days after independence, with the signing of the
Isthmian Canal Convention or Hay-Buneau Varilla Treaty
of 18 November 1903, which granted the United States
of America perpetual rights over 1,432 square kilome
ters of Panamanian territory, "as if it were sovereign",
to construct, operate and maintain the Panama Canal.
The construction of the Panama Canal was a
landmark in national and world maritime history.

Works

began as early as 1904, first with a general sanitary
operation that led to the medical breakthrough of Wil
liam C. Gorgas' discovery of the cause of yellow fever.
The construction itself was associated with the name
of engineer George W. Goethals, whose work has been
praised as the "Eighth Marvel of the World" and recently
declared an International Historical Monument by the
American Society of Civil Engineering (ASCE).
The first ship ever to transit the Panama Canal
was the SS Ancon, which made the inaugural trip on 15
August 1914.

Since that date, the Panama Canal has

been the focal point of economic and maritime activity
in the Republic of Panama, the most latent example of
the country's maritime potential.
Given Panama's permanent discomfort with the
1903 Panama Canal Treaty, the issue of regaining their
rightful jurisdiction over the Canal area has been the
daily bread of Panamanians.

After protracted and diffi

cult negotiations, whose last stage lasted ten years,
the signing of two new treaties concerning the Panama
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Canal signified a new chapter in the history of the
waterway and of the host country, perhaps the single
most important event influencing Panamanian maritime
affairs in the future.
After the final round of negotiations, in
which the peaceful vocation of the Panamanian people
provided a lesson for other nations of the world as
regards the peaceful resolution of conflicts, on 7
September 1977 the Head of State of the Republic of
Panama and the President of the United States of Ame
rica signed, in Washington D.C., the final texts of
the Panama Canal Treaty.Between the Republic of Panama
and the United States of America and the Treaty Con
cerning the Permanent Neutrality and Operation of the
Panama Canal Between the Republic of Panama and the
United States of America, which constitute the new
regime for this international waterway.

The two

treaties were subjected to the ratification procedures
of both countries and the Instruments of Ratification
exchanged between the two heads of goveirnment on 16
June 1978, in the city of Panama.

The Panama Canal

Treaties of 1977 finally entered into force six months
after the date when the Instruments of Ratification
went into effect for treaty purposes, on 1 October 1979.
The Panama Canal Treaties of 1977 have farreaching national and international implications.

For

world traders, they represent a guarantee that the
waterway - a vital transportation link - will be peace
fully and efficiently managed and operated until the
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year 2000 by the US Government agency called the Pana
ma Canal Commission (PCC), which is set up by the
treaty to replace the former Panama Canal Company and
take over some of the functions of the former Canal
Zone Government.

After 2000, Panama will take over

the whole canal operation.
The implications of these treaties domestic
ally are obviously crucial. To use language treaty,
2. In accordance with the terms of this Treaty
and related agreements, the Republic of Panama,
as territorial sovereign, grants to the United
States of America, for the duration of this Trea
ty, the rights necessary to regulate the transit
of ships through the Panama Canal, and to manage,
operate, maintain, improve, protect and defend
the Canal. The Republic of Panama guarantees to
the United States of America the peaceful use of
the land and water areas which it has been grant
ed the right to use for such purposes pursuant
to this Treaty and related agreements.
3. The Republic of Panama shall participate inc
reasingly in the management and protection and
^
defense of the Canal, as provided in this Treaty.
This means that Panama undertakes certain obligations
vis-a-vis the United States during the life of the
treaty, while at the same time specifying that the
country has to prepare itself for assuming full control
of the waterway through "the growing participation of
Panamanian nationals at all other levels and areas of
employment in the aforesaid Commission, with the ob
jective of preparing, in an orderly and efficient manner, for the assumption...." 8 by Panama of the duties
outlined herein.
From the above we can infer that Panama needs
both to increase its participation in canal affairs
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at all levels and to do so based on the improved
training of its nationals. This all-important con
cept of the training of Panamanians for handling
the canal, as well as the implications of studying
other transportation alternatives to the Panama
Canal will be discussed in more detail in subse
quent chapters of this dissertation.
The Open Registry Fleet
Aside from the construction of the Panama
Canal in 19*14, obviously the other maritime develop
ment of import during Panama's Republican Period is
the creation of the open registry of ships in 1925.
Several longstanding features of Panamanian
law served as the foundation for the country's mer
chant marine, officially created with the promulga
tion of Law No. 25 of 12 January 1925, which set the
guidelines for ship registration.

The Fiscal Code

of the republic, in particular, contained provisions
enabling Panamanian nationals to purchase vessels
abroad; to obtain provisional registration of their
ships from Panamanian consuls abroad; and to finalize
registration procedures upon arrival to the country.
"However, the purpose and use of this feature of the
law in the early years of the republic were limited
9
to Panamanian citizens and companies."
Although it is not our intention here to pro
vide a detailed account of the evolution of the re
gistry, we do feel it is interesting to note some
remarks made by Rodney Carlisle, who has done extensive
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research on the historical aspects of the origins and
evolution of the Panamanian and Liberian flags, on
the subject of the 1925 law on ship registration:
...the new law brought together the specific
existing attractions of the Panamanian codes.
The system for registry through consuls abroad,
previously covered by Article 589 of the Fiscal
Code, became Article 18 of the new law. The
1925 law made the procedures and steps for ship
registry clearer and more concise, producing
the neat, packaged code requested by shipowners.
Yet, several features of the law were writ
ten to provide Panama, at least on paper, with
new benefits. Article 16 revived an old Colom
bian requirement regarding the nationality of
crew, ans stated that at least ten per cent of
any crew on a Panamanian-registered vessel be
citizens of Panama, provided those applying for
employment are up to the physical and moral stand
ards required for the post. The proviso made it
clear that the ten per cent was, what a later era
would call an employment guideline; no recruit
ment goals or special training were specified to
bring employment up to a minimum quota... Article
17 empowered the Panamanian President to establish
»a maritime academy and to require that Panamanian^registered vessels employ its gradutates. (Our
emphasis).10
The same author later arrives at the conclu
sion that, although there is a general tendency to
believe that the Panamanian registry was created by
American shipowners and policy-makers to solve the
dilemmas of American shipping.
Evidence does not support such a conspiracy theo
ry of the development of the Panamanian system for
American purposes... The system did respond to the
pressures of shipowners, and to their desires for
an unregulated business environment._But_Panama__
fought the American business and official view___
that Panama's sovereignty was a sham and its flag
a symbol of sovereignty for sale(our emphasis).11
Setting aside for a moment the origins of the
Panamanian open registry system, it is also worth noting
that its evolution was also a product of Panamanian
creative thinking put to the test and of the ability
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of our lawyers and leaders to understand the needs
of foreign shipowners and to create a framework
within which these investors could feel attracted
to Panama.

In our opinion, despite arguments to

the contrary in a multiplicity of fora, the Pana
manian ships' register is an autoctonous product
born out of the creativity of a people that must
deal with the fact that they largely lack product
ive natural resources other than the country's geo
graphical configuration and position.

As such it

can be argued that the problems affecting the re
gistry are but a reflection of the fact that it is
run from Panama and by Panamanians and is, because
of this, subject to the vissicitudes of maritime
development in any developing country.
In line with this argument, a prominent
Panamanian lawyer and former negotiator of the
1977 Panama Canal Treaties, Dr. Carlos LopezGuevara, has explained the often-ignored link bet
ween Panama and its fleet in the following terms:
The main feature of our legislation is that it
is based upon_the governmental policy of attract
ing and protecting foreign investments and al
ways endeavouring not to be placed out of the
market by the competition. We are able to offer
stability because of our democratic way of govern
ment, our legislation and its interpretation. We
are very well known for keeping our contractual
obligations. Besides, w'e have the law on corpo
rations that follows the American pattern. This
law was enacted in 1932 and remains the same, as
an excellent example of the firmness of our insti
tutions. (Our emphasis)12
In accordance with our previous appreciations,
and of the fact that there are many aspects of Panama's
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maritime development in which there is room for imp
rovement, we shall now turn briefly to a consideration
of some of the problems facing the Panamanian open re
gistry fleet in contemporary times.

This we do as a

necessary first-step in the formulation of our strategy
for improvement later on.
Panama's open registry has always been the sub
ject of criticisms on the part of seafarers, governments
and international bodies.

By nature controversial and

considered to be a threat to the fleets of traditional
maritime nations and to developing countries aiming at
establishing their national shipping, the Panamanian
fleet can boast an excellent record of willingness to
listen and improve.

Yet, in the face of the latest

and most vehement of all attacks, the one being staged
by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Develop
ment (UNCTAD) in the form of an attempt to draft and
implement a convention on the conditions for the regis
tration of ships in any country, some comments must be
made here.
July 1976 was the time when concerted efforts
began, on a worldwide basis, to eliminate open regis
tries.

As some may remember, it was thdn that UNCTAD

created an Ad-Hoc Intergovernmental Working Group to
study and prepare a report on the effects of the exist
ence or lack of existence of a "genuine link" between
merchant vessels and their country of registration. This
first step was taken by the UNCTAD Secretariat itself,
with the support of developing countries, the Soviet
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Union and the Peoples' Republic of China.

The report

of the group was presented to UNCTAD V, held in Mani
la, and, from then on, over,ten long years which we
need not recount here, the arguments against the exist
ence of open registries have swayed over a very broad
spectrum.

From claims that they impeded the growth

of fleets in developing countries; to claims that the
overall safety, health and pollution prevention mea
sures that prevailed on board these vessels were ina
dequate; to .a more recent claim that all UNCTAD wants
is to estab.lish some kind of parameters for their opera
tion, the result is that there is now a more positive
appreciation of the trade and economic issues that are
really at stake.

In this regards, we feel that the

change in attitude at UNCTAD can be categorized as a
big step forward, and as a more mature way of looking
at shipping within the context of the maritime develop
ment of all nations, open registry countries included.
In July 1984 UNCTAD convened a diplomatic con
ference to begin work on a draft document on the condi
tions that should be required for the registration of
ships, pursuant to the mandate given to this body by
a UN General Assembly Resolution ( 37/209) dated 20
December 1982. This was mandated in the context of
UN General Assembly attempts to achieve the objectives
of the International Development Strategy for the Third
United Nations Development Decade.
After two subsequent meetings held in Geneva
this year (January and July), there is now at hand an
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approved draft convention and everything seems to indi
cate that some type of agreement will be reached in
January 1986, when the next scheduled meeting takes
place also in Geneva.
While the proposed text is but a very diluted ver
sion of UNCTAD's original proposals for the phasing
out of open registries in a period of ten years, the
draft is nevertheless a setback for all maritime na
tions in the sense that it will not achieve the main
goal for which it was allegedly prepared, viz., to
allow developing countries to build up their national
fleets.

The convention adds an emotional and political

burden to the achievement of that goal and, on the
other hand, says nothing about how a developing country
can really go about building its maritime activities
and administration.

By attempting to regulate what is

essentially a national competence and by not being able
either to destroy the open registries as it propounded,
all that is really achieved is the adoption .of a dan
gerous precedent

as regards crucial issues such as the

treatment of foreign investments in a country or the
use of the international machinery-for harmonizing ideas
and not for pitting nations against nations.

CHAPTER TWO
A STRATEGY FOR NATIONAL MARITIME DEVELOPMENT
In the previous chapter we tried to trace the
historical development of maritime-related activities
in the Republic of Panama, as a way of justifying our
initial contention that Panama is a maritime nation
par excellence and also as a way of indicating the real
growth potential which the author attaches to these
activities.

We now propose to introduce the global

concept of our strategy f^r acFTevihg" PanaTma'-’^xrprtriTfnTm
maritime development over the next f if teen-yearsT~~~Th
subsequent chapters we will particularize proposals
for the most important maritime activities and how we
feel our proposals could be 'put into practice.
The main natural resources of Panama are its
geographical location and configuration.

During our

^ a r s as> a maritime administrator, we became convinced
that, in order to make optimum use of these resources,
and for them to generate the resources needed for sust
aining our population and investing in the future, Pa
nama needs to devise and implement a coherent develop
ment st^^tegy__for_its maritime sector.

For the purposes

of this dissertation, "national maritime sectormeans
the set of resources and activities that are carried
out in Panama and which are directly related to the sea.
24
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including the human resources, the open registry fleet,
the national ports, maritime ancillary industries, the
Panama Canal and fishing activities.

The national ma

ritime sector thus defined into its principal compo
nents is the subject of this study and of the develop
ment strategy we are posposing herein for an optimum
utilization of Panama's geographical position (See
Figure 3).
Before we outline the strategy per se, we feel
it is necessary to provide our readers with a brief
but comprehensive overview of the current performance,
in social and economic terms, of each of the main compo
nents of the national maritime sector, as a way of high
lighting their relative importance within the economy
today and also of hinting at their potential for growth
Beginning with the open registry, we find that
it is the second largest merchant fleet in the world.
As of 30 June 1985, according to Panamanian Government
sources, it included 11,850 ships that totalled some
51,177,683 grt. 13 The fleet currently produces around
$50 million US dollars per year in direct tax revenues
to the Panamanian State, plus almost double that amount
by way of legal and other services.
In the field of employment of nationals, how
ever, the figures indicate marginal growth.

Three

big shipowners with offices located in Panama City
employ the most significant amount of Panamanian sea
farers, but these are only seamen.

These companies

are Esso, Texaco and Panavigas, a subsidiary of Hapag
Lloyd.

tvj

o>
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On a separate and interesting experimental
basis, there are some 300 Panamanian officers and
seamen currently employed on board Panamanian-flag
vessels under tKe terms of a collective employment
agreement that was negotiated directly between the
Asociacion Panamena de Oficiales de Marina ( APOMthe Panamanian merchant marine officers' organiza
tion) and the Union Nacional de Marinos de Panama
(UNMP- one of the the two principal unions of Pana
manian merchant seamen).

The 300 men that were

employed for differing periods of time between Sep
tember 1983 and December 1984 earned a total of US
$300,000, a figure that indicates the potential that
lies in the field. 14
Despite the fact that Panama had no direct
control over the operations of its two principal
deepwater ports until the entry into force of the
1977 Panama Canal Treaties, Balboa and Cristobal
have continued to operate without major problems
in the period following their return to Panamanian
jurisdiction.

As seen in Table 1, by 1984 Balboa

had dramatically increased its cargo handling fig
ures, from 176,184 metric tons in the previous year
to 402,144 metric tons at the end of 1984.

The same

applies to Cristobal, which increased the amount of
cargo handled, from 138,495 metric tons in 1983 to
416,020 metric tons at the end of 1984. These figures
include the handling of national industrial exports
for a total value of US$71.6 million in 1984 also

15
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PANAMANIAN PORTS MOVEMENT
Table 1. Balboa and Cristobal Ports Movement (1983-1984)

C R IS T O B A L

S H IP S
CARSO Cm .T.)

■

BALBOA

iee3

1984

1983

1964

779

1754

70 f

1398

176 m

402/44

/3 6495 418 020

59245

lO A D E D

39700

22014

OKJLOADED

tZ06(>B 35877i

7X4770 382444

CONTAINERS

17205

4.8938

744S70 3 /2 2 4

6577

23309

7344

78773

6628

23627

7067

7S777

LOADED
UMLOADED
----------^
—

Source; Panamanian Ship, June 1984 and
February 1985.

Table 2.

Balboa and Cristobal Port Movement (Jan-March 1985
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An indication of early 1985 performance is found in
Table 2.
It has been further estimated that, if the
Panamanian Government finally decides to go ahead
with its plans for the Panama Centreport Project,
the country could receive ah additional US$150 million
per year in revenues and some 15,000 new jobs would
be created.
With respect to marine ancillary industries
there are almost no economic performance indicators
available.

These include a minimum of ten different

marine support activities, viz., cargo-handling, pipeline,
lighterage, transportation, warehousing, shiprepairs,
ship stores and supplies, bunkering, shipping opera
tions, ship agency and freight forwarding, banking
and commercial services, tourism, telecommunications
and the Free Zone of Colon. It is worth singling out,
however, two of these industries for which more data
is available.
Since October 1982, the trans-isthmian oil
pipeline operated by Petroterminal de Panama, S.A.
has become an important revenue earner for Panama.
This pipeline is devoted to the transport of Alaskan
crude oil from the port of Charco Azul, in the Paci
fic coast of the province of Chiriqui, to the port
of Chriqui Grande, in the Atlantic coast of the pro
vince of-Bbcas del Toro.

At present, the company

employs 450 Panamanians on a permanent basis and pays
an average of US$ 9 million in wages.

An additional
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contribution to the economy, at least at the provincial level, is the fact 500 jobs have been created
in the two provinces, while it is estimated that the
company made purchases of about US$20 million in the
local commerce and paid electricity bills of almost
US$8.5 million.

As a holder of 40% of the company's

shares, Panama's Government recently received a check
for US$28 million in dividends, aside from the US$28.4
17
million that it received in the way of taxes.
The other ancillary industry for which some
figures are available is that of shiprepairs.

The

main shiprepairers in Panama, Astilleros Balboa S.A.
(ASBA)is a private Franco-Panamanian company that be
gan operations in 1982 and has grown at a slow but
steady rate since then. Company sources estimate that
they have served an average of 100 vessels per year.
18
In 1984, ASBA employed between 225 and 350 workers.
Fishing is the country's second export reve
nue earner, after bananas.

According to industry

reports, in 1984 Panama exported 10,980 MT of fish,
worth US$55.6 million.

The industry represents an

investment of around US$150 million, of which US$80
million belong to private companies and the rest to
the State. Around 5,000 workers are employed in fish19
ing, and almost 25,000 Panamanians depend on it.
Obviously, the principal maritime activity in
Panama is the Panama Canal.

In terms of revenues, it

is estimated that it makes an annual contribution of
some US$600 million to the national economy.

Around
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6,000 Panamanians are employed by the PCC, while it
is often argued that it is likewise the indirect
source of many other benefits and revenues, especially
those connected with services rendered to transiting
vessels.
It is expected that the indicators we have
provided herein underscore the fact that there is al
ready in existence in Panama a comprehensive set of
sea-related activities that contribute significantly
to the economy and the grounds for whose growth it
V

is our goal to prepare through the implementation of
our Strategy.
The Strategy; Premises and Assumptions
The first aspect that we must bear in mind
is that this Strategy is based on the contents of
UNCLOS III and that it strives to illustrate how Pa
nama can make use of its concepts for fostering na
tional maritime development until 2000.

In order to

do this, of course, resort must be made to the na
tional development strategy in order to identify the
guidelines, resources and tools available for doing so.
Such a premise is not only desirable but ne
cessary, for our Strategy.

As a nation fully commit

ted to the ideals of the United Nations organization
and basically identified with the needs and aspira
tions of developing countries like itself, Panama
cannot and should not attempt to develop the resources
of its geography and ocean waters without giving due
regard to UNCLOS III, even if it is not yet in force.
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Notwithstanding the fact that they have not been
officially linked, it is necessary to indicate here
that, as far as developing countries are concerned,
UNCLOS III is the only building block available for
instituting the New International Economic Order we
are longing for.
It is not essential to discuss in this paper
the scope of UNCLOS III nor to enumerate the topics
it deals with.

Suffice it to say that, wherever it

could be relevant, UNCLOS III contains a provision
that could be applied to one or the other maritime
activity present in the Republic of Panama.
in our opinion, the instrument

Moreover,

provides rather good

and comprehensive guidelines for developing not only
shipping, but the rest of the maritime activities
that we wish to foster in Panama.

The following parts

of the convention are particularly relevant to Panama
nian maritime activities: Part II, on the Territorial
Sea and Contiguous Zone; Part V, on the Exclusive Econ
omic Zone; Part VI, on the Continental Shelf; Part VII,
on the High Seas; Part XII, on Protection and Preser
vation of the Marine Environment; and Part XIV, on the
Development and Transfer of Marine Technology.
Despite the fears that this premise may raise
r
in some of my compatriots, who may be concerned with
the effect of the clauses relating to nationality of
ships and genuine link (Article 91)';. and with the du
ties of the Flag State (Article 94), after a thorough
and careful evaluation of these provisions, and of
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consultations with experts in the Law of the Sea, we
are able to state that there is no contradiction bet
ween the convention and Panama's current handling of
its maritime affairs.

Panama's shipping director him

self, Dr. Hugo Torrijos, has stated that UNCLOS III
"does not, as some would argue, contradict the open
registry system being practiced by Panama, but instead
favours it.

We have taken the steps to exercise full

control and jurisdiction over vessels." 20 Thus, per
haps only pending the final outcome of the UNCTAD
Conference on Ship Registration ( next meeting sche
duled for January 1986 !) in order to see if that body
produces a more clear-cut definition of the "genuine
link", the Republic of Panama should entertain the
possibility of ratifying UNCLOS III after a close eva
luation of its merits and without ignoring political
expediency.
Questions of nationality of ships and flag
jurisdiction aside, it is important to note that the
UNCLOS III Convention is the umbrella for all of the
activities of the International Maritime Organization
(IMO) in the fields of training of marine personnel,
maritime safety and prevention and control of marine
pollution from vessels.

By using the language and

spirit of the convention first, and then’ going ahead
with a full implementation of IMO international stan
dards through a .qualitative improvement of the coun
try's maritime sdfety administration and maritime
training schemes, Panama can fulfill its duties under
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the international conventions and also make a signi
ficant contribution to make the seas safer and the
oceans cleaner.
A second premise of the Strategy is that the
current institutional framework of Panama's maritime
activities and industries are gene-rally adequate for
implementing the actions we recommend and that only
minor organizational changes are necessary at this
stage and until the target year 2000.

By institutional

framework here we mean both the private and the govern
ment agencies and companies that currently develop
some type of maritime activity in Panama.

Included

in the governmental group are: the national maritime
administration, called Direccion General Consular y
de Naves of the Panamanian Ministry of Finance and
Treasury (SECNAVES); the national ports administration,
called Autoridad Portuaria Nacional (APN), an autono
mous agency of the national government under the di
rection of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry; the
national fishing administration, called Direccion Ge
neral de Recursos Marinos (DGRM), a department of the
Ministry of Commerce and Industry; the nautical school,
called Escuela Nautica de Panama (ENP), which depends
on the Ministry of Education; and a separate agency
of the US Government, the PCC, which is nevertheless
run by a Board of Directors composed of four Panamanians
and five US citizens until the year 19^, when this protion will be directly inverted to give preference to
nationals of the Republic of Panama.
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The first three agencies we have described
above would need to make some organizational changes
in order to implement the strategic goals we will
outline for them shortly.

These changes, however,

are basically geared towards a strengthening of their
technical, operational and policy-making departments.
This is a simple but essential step, as the current
staff composition of these three institutions is now
adays too heavily burdened with professionals who
have no formal training oE relevant experience in
basic areas such as: marine engineering, naval archi
tecture and nautical subjects; general maritime admin
istration and maritime safety administration; maritime
transport; shipping; and oceanology.

The fourth ins

titution on the list, the ENP, is the only exception
to the general rule we have stated here, meaning that
its staff is largely composed of marine officers who,
although young and inexperienced,, are now training to
become professional maritime educators.

The last ins

titution on our list, the PCC, is running most effi
ciently and no changes in its setup are desirable for
the time being, except perhaps -as may be envisaged in
the agreements for the execution of the canal treaties.
Also as a part of our second premise, we must
say a word about the need for increased collaboration
and integrative mechanisms within government.

Because

all maritime activities are interrelated, in order to
optimize resource allocation and exploitation, all
government agencies and institutions of the Panamanian
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national maritime sector must work together to produce coherent, comprehensive policies.

21

This colla

boration will probably, in the course of time, re
sult in an increased awareness of the need to create
new agencies for greater shipping and ocean develop
ment.

In this connection, we would recommend the

creation of national ad hoc committee of maritime
experts, wholly composed of Panamanian citizens, who
would be directly responsible to the President of
the Republic and whose task it would be to assist
the Executive in the formulation of maritime poli
cies, including a formal statement of Panama's ma
ritime policy, the necessary first-step for national
maritime development in any country.
To aid the government policy-makers in the
structuring of such a committee, we would recommend
consideration of the experience of nations such as
Portugal, with its Ministry of the Sea; Prance, with
-\
its State Seeretariat~'fh-^charge of the Sea and a
junior minister in -charge of the merchant marine;
Sri Lanka's National Aquatic Resources Agency (KARA);
and India's Department of Ocean Development (DOD),
under the Prime Minister himself.

A step in this

last direction would undoubtedly place Panama in a
much better and "competitive position for optimizing
the benefits derived from its natural resources.
The third and final assumption we make con
cerns the future demand for Panamanian transport and
related services, as well as for the resources of
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its oceans.

We have assumed that, given Panama's

maritime background and the timely adoption of the
recommendations we include in our Strategy, the
country will continue to enjoy a privileged posi
tion in world trade, well into the next century.
Demand for fish and other living resources of the
Panamanian territorial and economic waters will
probably increase and, given current exploitation
practices, supplies will be plentiful during the
period.

In essence, all other things remaining

equal, the attainment of ourstrategic goals will
allow Panama to increase its maritime activity
levels to new heights, earn additional revenues
for sustaining the population and improving their
standard of living, and for allowing the country
to invest in other export-oriented activities in
the not too distant future.
The Strategy; Development Goals
This dissertation has been entitled Panama
_A Strategy for National Maritime Development
because it presents at its core a general, longrange scheme for guiding the development of Panama's
maritime activities over the next fifteen years. These
are our recommendations for improving the economic
and social performance indicators of the sector, with
the ultimate aim of contributing to the welfare of all
Panamanians.

It is not a "plan", that is, a detailed

program of action priorities.

Neither can it be cons-

38

idered a "program", or timing for the execution of
a plan through Concrete projects.

It is rather a

compilation of the basic information needed for
making many government and private company plans,
programs, projects or schemes aimed at helping Pa
nama achieve full maritime development by the year
2000.

The purpose of the Strategy, as outlined

earlier, is to orient the Panamanians about the
possibilities for improving the quality and the
amount of the benefits they derive from the sea,
as a way of making the country more economically
and politically independent.
The Strategy itself should best be defined
as a set of development goals to be achieved by
each of the components of the national maritime
sector within the period 1986-2000.

These goals,

and how to translate them into reality, are explain
ed in more detail in subsequent chapters dealing
specifically with each maritime activity being car
ried out in Panama, but we must at this stage identi
fy them as follows:
GOAL 1 - Development of Human Resources in the
Maritime Field; Within the time limit
of fifteen years, it is our goal to
train enough deck and engine officers,
ratings, naval architects, general mar
itime and maritime safety administrators,
shipping company managers, and maritime
educators to satisfy the personnel needs
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of the national maritime sector and to
provide added employment opportunities
for Panama's fast-growing population.
GOAL 2 - Fostering the employment of Panamanian
seafarers on board national flag ves-sels:
This goal is aimed at providing Panama
nian seafarers with the necessary sea
time and shipboard experience required
by IMO's Convention on Standards of Train
ing, Certification and Watchkeeping,1978
(better known as the STCW Convention,1978).
It is a goal intimately connected to the
strengthening of the links between the
country and its fleet, the reduction of
conflicts with port states and interna
tional seafarers's unions, and to the
training of Panamanian pilots for the
Panama Canal.
GOAL 3 - Strengthening of the National Maritime
Safety Administration;

Under this goal

we envisage the adoption and full imple
mentation of all major IMO conventions
relating to safety and pollution prev
ention and control, with an aim of imp
roving the fleet's safety record, reduc
ing casualties that result in loss of
life or extensive damage to the marine
environment, and of generally increasing
the efficiency of the open registry fleet.
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GOAL 4

- Development of Panama's two maj^n_dee£water ports into a major container__
transshipment center called "Panama_
Centreport^;

This goal envisions the

establishment of .another non-marine
transportation to the Panama Canal in
the isthmus, to serve world trade needs
arising from the container revolution
and its more receni development, the
round-the-world services of US Lines
and Evergreen, among others.
GOAL 5

- Catering to the needs of domestic trade
and transport needs via the improvement
of strategic regional ports infrastruct
ures : With this goal we endeavour to
encourage the progress of Panama's hint
erland and the regional integration of
the country by ensuring that key popula
tion and production centers are suitably
served by the national ports network.

GOAL 6

- Fostering the growth and strengthening
i——

____

better serve the Panama Canal and the
national ports, especially shiprepairs
and tourism;

Within the ambit of this

goal we include the adoption of all
viable measures for making available
in Panama the cheap and efficient sup
port services required by maritime trans-
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port.

Special consideration must be

given, with this goal, to those act
ivities that have a greater and faster
growth potential, such as shiprepairs
and tourism offerings for passengers
on board cruise vessels and for crews
making stopovers in Panama.
GOAL 7

- Evaluating the transportation alterna
tives to the Panama Canal, giving due
consideration to "^he Panamanian Alt
ernative" that favours a new locks ca
nal built around the existing route;
This goal represents the need to carry
out serious feasibility studies of all
major transportation alternatives to
the Panama Canal, as mandated by the
1977 Panama C^nal Treaties, with the
objective of deciding what is the best
alternative for Panama.

GOAL 8

- Promoting the fishing industry through
a modernization of existing legislation,
the granting of incentives for the dev
elopment of a modern and efficient fish/ inq fleet that can exploit the resources
of the Exclusive Economic Zone, and the
diversification of exports and of national
fish consumption patterns: Under this
goal we encompass all the possible ways
of optimizing the benefits that Panama
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derives from its fishing activities,
both for consumption and for export.
The eight goals we have previously outlined
constitute the targets for which individual components
of the national maritime sector must aim.

Their eva

luation first, and implementation later, we believe,
will result in great benefit to Panama and its people
in the short and medium run through the reduction of
conflicts with other states, the improved image of
Panama in the international arena, the generation of
new jobs and sources of revenue, and the consolida
tion of a truly healthy climate for maritime activi
ties in the country.

CHAPTER THREE
HUMAN RESOURCES
Human resources are the most abundant of all
resources available to nations, although the harnes
sing of their potential is always costly and timeconsuming.

The goal of training and of increasing

the expertise of human resources in different facets
of human activity is thus always a major considera
tion when working to effect change.
When we started to work on this dissertation,
\

it suddenly became very obvious that our first and
foremost problem in implementing any strategy, no
matter how simple or complex, would be the lack of
Panamanians specifically trained in maritime affairs.
Although the population of the country generally en
joys a high level of education in traditional fields
of knowledge, in areas such a shipping and maritime
affairs there is a very big vacuum.

We then came up

with the idea of making the training of human resour
ces for the Panamanian maritime sector our number one
and overriding goal, the goal that, if and when it
is achieved, will allow us to ride the waves triumph
antly towards Panama's full maritime development.
Although maritime activities in Panama seem
healthy for the time being, in today's highly complex
shipping scenario there is no longer any room left
43
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for improvising, and the time will soon come when
expertise in maritime affairs will be essential
for the continued success of the national maritime
sector.

Up to now, as we have indicated at times

in the course of this essay, developments in Panama
seem haphazard, and no good explanation can be of
fered to our readers as to why things have prosper
ed in the midst of apparent disarray and lack of
design.
The preparation of this Strategy for nation
al maritime is partly aimed at correcting this sit
uation.

Such great attention is being given at the

international level to maritime training, both at
IMO and at the International Labour Organization(ILO),
as well as in the context of the provisions of UNCLOS
III, that Panama cannot escape for much long,er the
strength of the tide.

Something must be done short

ly about the training of maritime personnel and the
ideas we will outline here are simply guidelines for
trying to correct what we believe are the two main
human resources problems prevailing in Panama, viz.,
the lack of specialized maritime personnel in several
specific categories, and the inability of Panamanian
seafarers, especially officers, to get the necessary
experience for becoming full officers and for enjoy
ing the possibilities of a good remuneration, more
expertise and a better standard of living that are
elsewhere associated with the profession.
In the current setup we find that the only
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opportunity for maritime training is offered by the
ENP.

This training is aimed at deck and engineer

officers basically, although there is also a oneyear program for ratings.

Tentative plans for creat

ing a school for polivalent ratings in the province
of Colon were abandoned some time ago due to govern
mental apathy and the fact that the project itself
had not been adequately structured.

Similarly, more

interesting plans for the creation of special mari
time training high schools in certain areas of the
country with known interest in the seas and fishing
were also abandoned some years ago, due mainly to
political considerations.
Given the fact that training is only availa
ble for officers and, to a lesser degree, for ratings,
we must now discuss the ways in which this training
can be improved.

This must be done, of course, start

ing from the fact that Panama is not a traditional
maritime nation and that the employment of nationals
has never been really fostered.
The issue of training Panamanian seafarers
must be viewed at two different levels: the national
and the international level.

At the national level

we face the question of how to make this training
fit within the overall scheme of the open registry,
a much debated and politically salient issue. And,
on the other hand, we have the question of why invest
in this type of education if there are no guaranteed
returns, no possibilities for employment, and also the
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question of how to train pilots and other floating
equipment personnel for the Panama Canal without
sending them to sea/ as is usual in more advanced
maritime nations.
At the second level of analysis we find the
problems associated with Panama's image within the
developing world community, the country's many bilat
eral and multilateral commitments, and the heteroge
neity of the pool of seafarers that mans Panama's
open registry fleet and who must be protected while
sailing under the national flag.
Arriving at a compromise between these two
levels of analysis is very difficult indeed, but we
feel that Panama should make a real effort in this
regards.

Despite the economic disruptions that many

advocates of the status quo dream about, the fact is
that there will be no more maritime development in
Panama or increases in revenues unless Panamanians
are adequately trained for handling maritime affairs,
private companies and government agencies included.
Reasons brandished for not moving in this direction
are becoming increasingly unacceptable and will event
ually result in a deterioration of current performance
levels and an impoverishment of the population, exact
ly the opposite of what everybody hopes for.
So far, efforts to train seafarers, as we have
explained, have generally fared better than efforts
to find them jobs.

This situation prevails in spite

of the fact that under Article 226 of Panama's Labour
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Code, the legislation regulating the employment of
seafarers on board Panamanian-flag vessels, provides
for a ten per cent of all seamen on board each na
tional vessel to be composed of Panamanian nationals,
or of foreigners married to Panamanians or having
Panamanian children, provided they reside in Panama.
This unwillingness of the Panamanian govern
ments of all times to permit Panamanians to work on
board ships seems to contradict other efforts aimed
at improving the quality of the education offered by
the ENP.

According to the school's Director, Capt.

Antonio Motta,
....the school's new curriculum has proved that
it fulfills its commitments, since reports re
ceived from masters and shipping companies about
our cadets are satisfactory. Success is due to
efforts undertaken by the school's officials,the
■Work and dedication of the professors, and the
development of the PAN/81/005 Technical Assist
ance Project being executed by IMO and financed
by the Panamanian Government and the United Na
tions Development Program (UNDP).22
However, these efforts, humble and inadequate
as they may seem to some, must be appreciated within
the framework of the situation that we have outlined
here.

This seems to be but yet another reflection

of the fact that the right hand does not know what
the left hand is doing, or that it is at least con
veniently ignoring it.

Anyhow, the net result is

that despite extremely adverse conditions, some prog
ress is being in the field of maritime training in
Panama.
As we have noted earlier in this chapter,
little progress has been done in the way of allowing
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or, at least, helping Panamanians to find jobs on
board national flag vessels.

The only notable ex

ception to this are the courageous efforts of the
APOM and the UNMP to find jobs for their members
through the arrangement of private collective emp
loyment agreements, an effort that must somehow be
understood by the decision-makers and complemented
with more solid action.
The main reasons behind our concern for the
training of Panamanian seafarers, and especially
of officers, is the fact that Panama cannot hope
to move forward in maritime affairs unless it can
count on people that have had some kind of sea ex
perience.

Knowledge of what a ship is and what it

needs, as well as of the general aspects of ships
operations are essential for ensuring a quick turnround in ports, delivering good and quick services,
and generally attracting maritime and shipping clients.
The problems that Panama faces today with its ports,
the open registry fleet and other related activities,
I dare say, are born essentially out of the lack of
adequate training of the personnel in charge of those
activities.

Yet the real problem will be faced as

the time approaches for taking over the operations of
the Panama Canal, a highly sophisticated operation
that requires not only good business administrators
and lawyers^ but also plenty of technical personnel,
not the least of which are the pilots that compose
the pilot force that is the heart of the entire canal
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organization and functioning.
Within Panama's overall training problems,
the problem of the training of Panamanian pilots
deserves special consideration here.

The reason

is that, despite impeccable efforts on the part of
the Panama Canal Commission to train as many Pana
manians as possible within the limits of their bud
get and space availability on board PCC floating
equipment and units, this is the area where Panama
nian participation in the canal's labour force is
weakest.
The Panama Canal is unique in the sense that,
quite unlike Suez and Kiel, where pilots are just
advisors to the ship's master, while in Panama Canal
waters the ship is under the full control and command
of the Panama Canal pilot.

This is possible, in the

opinion of maritime training experts and shipping
people, only because of the highly qualified pilot
force that we find there, an aspect that Panama must
not overlook as it makes plans for taking over the
waterway at the turn of the century.
Capt. Jeremlas De Leon, Panama's first pilot,
refers to the problem of pilot training in a rather
worried tone, stating that "only 29 (12.2%) of us
(Panamanians) have achieved this goal. At this pace,
less than three per year, it will take us 86 YEARS
23
to replace the remaining 208 US citizens."
in genecal terms, Capt. De Leon's concerns are shared by
IMO's maritime training expert, Capt. Max Tiedemann,
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who visited Panama during March-April 1979 on a
special mission to evaluate pilot training in the
Panama Canal.

Capt. Tiedemann arrived at the fol

lowing recommendations, which we quote here because
of the fact that their author is a highly qualified
senior pilot at the Kiel Canal and a man of great
experience and learning;
2. Panama should be advised that, in order to
meet the STCW Conference regulation II/2, the
current practice of requiring a Master Mariner's
Certificate/License as a condition of entry into
the Pilotage Service should be continued. This
is especially necessary in the case of the Panama
Canal, in order to inspire the confidence of the
Master from whom the pilot takes over command and,
at the same time, to retain credibility within
the international shipping community.24
With the above quote we end our discussion
of the training of pilots for the Panama Canal and
of the need for Panamanian seamen, especially the
officers, to be allowed to gain the necessary expe
rience on board Panamanian-flag vessels. Needless
to say, we feel this an area that should be assigned
the utmost priority in the immediate future, or else
Panama risks the possibility of being unable to com
ply with treaty provisions.
With respect to the training of other types
of personnel that we have described under Goals 1
and 2, we feel that the best alternative is to make
extensive use of the training available at the World
Maritime University in Malmo, Sweden.

This institu

tion was created under the auspices of IMO precisely
to help developing countries overcome the lack of
qualified maritime personnel. Instruction and on-the-job

A
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training are available as part of the curriculum at
the WMU, and we feel there is really no better ins
titution in its field.
Should financial considerations, however,
limit the possibility of a large number of Panama
nians being able to obtain their traning in general
maritime administration, maritime safety administra
tion, management of shipping companies, and maritime
education and training at the WMU, then we would ad
vise taking as many opportunities as are available
for training Panamanians in other institutions abroad,
through the widespread utilization of scholarships
and other similar funding arrangements.

Although

the training may not be in ekactly the fields we have
specified, training in any similar or related field
of maritime activity, and living in a country that
generally enjoys a healthy climate for shipping and
maritime investments will undoubtedly contribute to
the achievement of the overall goal.
Finally, when we considered training in the
areas of port management and operations, and of fishing
we arrived at the conclusion that, aside from efforts
to improve the qualifications of local fishermen via
the establishment of special courses, training in these
areas could be best arranged under the auspices of
the international organizations dealing with the sub
jects, viz., UNCTAD, ILO and the International Food and
Agriculture Organization (FAO).

Additional possibili

ties for training could come from bilateral agreements
with countries like The Netherlands, Egypt and Portugal

CHAPTER FOUR
THE OPEN REGISTRY FLEET
The open registry is perhaps the feature,
besides the Panama Canal, that best identifies Pa
nama as a Maritime Nation.

Created almost with the

republic at the turn of the twentieth century, the
registry has evolved over a long period of time to
become nowadays one of the country's principal ma
ritime activities and a source of significant reve
nues for country nationals, except seafarers.
In our chapter dealing with human resources
we outlined the role that this Strategy feels should
be played by the fleet in support of an integral dev
elopment of Panamanian national maritime activities.
This role encompasses

both a revenue-producing and

and training component. The training component of
the role has been dealt with in that same chapter
and requires no further elaboration. On the subject
of revenue-earning, we feel that a general comment
is necessary perhaps now.
Considering the current recession in the
world shipping markets, at this stage we cannot fore
see any significant growth, in real terms, for the
Panamanian fleet.

Marginal growth will continue to

be registered, but this represents basically a change
52

53

in flags and only a small increase via newbuilding
registrations.

This means that, for the time being,

probably the most optimistic we can be as regards
the fleet is to hope for a maintenance of current
growth levels.
In this stage, which is basically an inte
rim stage in which no majnfchanges will take place
in the structure of the world fleet, we feel it
would be wise for Panama to take the time to work
on some aspects of its maritime safety administra
tion that could benefit from changes in organiza
tion and from the introduction of more qualified
personnel into decision-making and technical areas.
Thus, in our opinion, the time is right for "putting
the house in order" while awaiting for an improve
ment in the market situation.
Beginning with a consideration of its legal
framework, which we have not discussed at any length
thus far, we propose now to analyze the possibili
ties for improving the open registry fleet and for
preparing the grounds for .reaping greater benefits
when the shipping activities pick up.

In this res

pect, we shall first take a look at the different
sets of laws that permit the operation of the fleet.
Registration Laws
As described in Chapter One, Law No.8 of 1925
is the basic law of the Panamanian ships register,
since it establishes the conditions for the registra
tion of vessels.

This law was in turn complemented
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by Law No.54 of 1926, which spells out the proce
dures for the cancellation of ship's registration
in Panama.
Today it is possible to register virtually
any type of vessel in Panama, except pleasure boats
under 20 meters in length or below 50 grt.

Vessels

registered in Panama can be of any age, provided
they are able to obtain the necessary documents for
international trading. Panamanian law does not impose
major restrictions on vessel registration; barges,
floating docks, pontoons, drilling rigs, dredges and
any other floating structure which requires a nationsality can be registered in Panama.
As regards ownership, it is a well-known fact
that any national or foreigner may own and register
a ship under the Panamanian flag. A

vessel may be

wholly owned by

foreigners, but the law provides that

these owners be

locally represented at all times,

least through a

Panamanian attorney or law firm.

at

Aside from the two basic registration laws that
we mentioned at the outset, mention must be also made
of Law No.2 of 1980, since it introduced several
changes in the original ship registration regime. To
begin with, it organized the Directorate General of
Consular and Maritime Affairs as a directorate within
the Panamanian Ministry of Finance and Treasury and
gave it essentially all the powers relating to a na
tional maritime administration, especially those re
garding the implementation of international safety
and pollution prevention and control measures, as
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well as other more traditional functions such as
those of licensing of marine personnel, surveys
and inspections, and policy-making for the open
registry fleet.

This law reorganized the system

for the issue of statutory and provisional certi
ficates of registry for Panamanian vessels, to
correct some of the problems that had been docu
mented under the previous arrangement, where these
documents were issued on a permanent basis.
law further

The

provided for the de facto cancella

tion of ships from the Panamanian registry; it
strengthened the functions of SECNAVES as the
national maritime administration; and also pro
vided for sanctions in the case of non-compliance
with international maritime conventions ratified
by Panama.

Finally, this law restricted the reg

istration of yatchs in Panama, largely to avoid
the administrative complications that had been long
associated with their registration under the na
tional flag.
With the introduction of this last law
on registration of ships, we feel that Panama is
more than adequately prepared to undertake its
full responsabilities under international instru
ments

and that, for the time being, no changes

should be contemplated in the registration regime.
Corporation Law
B.N. Metaxas has made the point that "in
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addition to straightforward cost considerations and
pecuniary economies/ other criteria are applied by
entreprenuers in deciding on the flag under which
the vessel will be registered.. .The device of flags
of convenience presupposes the existence of a.certain
business organization form."^^ In this connection,
it has often been stated that Panama's corporation
1av^is one of the cornerstones of the open registry
and of other international activities operated in
the country, such as the banking, insurance and reinfinrance centers.

The Panamanian law of corpora

tions which regulates the organization and manage
ment of corporations, and the registration of fo
reign corporations' branches in Panama, "has five
major characteristics: a) simplicity in the organi
zation and management; b) quickness in organizing it;
ci *low organization and maintenance costs; d) the
absence of governmental controls, except in the case
of value offered to the public; and e) legal stabi
lity. "26
According to Panama's prominent maritime law
yer, Dr. Lopez-Guevara, the creators of Law No. 32
"did not envisage the great success that it would
have.

But the success is evident in the fact that,

up until December 1983, some 350,000 corporations
were registered in Panama."

o7

As in the case of the registration regime,
because of the fact that Panama's corporation law
embodies the element of stability and predictability
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that generally attracts foreign shipowners.and inves
tors, no changes to this law are recommended.
Commercial Laws
The Panamanian Code of Commerce of 1917 is
the other key piece of legislation affecting ship
registration in Panama, since it generally regulates
titles to vessels and mortgages thereon.

Under its

Book II, as modified by Law No.14 of 27 May 1980,
we find the legal provisions relating to vessels,
shipowners, ship operators, maritime credits and
their respective privileges, ship mortgages, attach
ment and sale of vessels, and prescription.
In Panama, ship registration is carried out,
on the basis of the registration and commercial laws
we have outlined, through two governmental departments,
namely, SECNAVES and the Public Registry, a semiautonomous agency of the Ministry of Government and
5

' .

Justice.

28

After the initial request for registration

is made by a Panamanian lawyer to SECNAVES or to any
Q

of the special Panamanian consulates abroad empowered
to register vessels, it follows that the owner's ti
tle to the ship and any mortgages on it must be rec
orded at the Public Registry, in order to protect the
respective rights.

The ship is provisionally entered

in the Panamanian registry and titles and mortages
are preliminarily entered also at the Public Registry.
Legal title to a vessel will be established
when its document (Bill of Sale or other supporting
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evidence) of title is recorded at the Public Regis
try office in Panama.

But such registration need

not be effected in Panama right at the start. By
means of Law No.14 of 1980, a special’system for
the registration of titles and mortgages was created.
According to one of its "fathers". Dr. Jose Angel
Noriega,
This law created a more practical system than
Law No.40 of 1956, since instead of requiring
their handwritten registration in large and
bulky volumes at the Panamanian consulates
abroad, it provided for a new system in which
the interested party just fills out a form
before the Consul, detailing the major items
contained in the mortgage. The Consul then
transmits these details via telex to the Pana
manian public registry, where the information
is microfilmed and the provisional registra
tion is thus executed. The interested party
then has a six-month period in whSL'Ch to file
the documents necessary for the final regis
tration of the ship's mortgage. This system
is also applicable in the registration of
deeds. Law No.14 of 1980 allows the mortgagee
to obtain a quick mortgage guarantee and to
ensure the money needed for purchasing the
vessel. This, in turn, makes it easier. for 9 q
the vessel to enter the Panamanian registry. ■*=’
Finally, we note briefly the main aspects
of the most recent changes to Panama's commercial
legislation. Law No.43 of 8 November 1984.

This

law is also about mortgages and was prepared by
the Maritime Law Association of Panama in order
to address some problems that had arisen with respect to substantive provisions of the Commercial
Code.

The basic innovations included in this law

deal with: interest rates, marginal notes, the need
to fix the value of the vessel in case of auction,
aspects regarding revolving credits, formalities of
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the mortgage, multi-currency, presumption regarding
sums owed, private sale, publicity of the private
sale, how to fix the manner of payment and the int
erest rate, preliminary registrations made in Panama,
preliminary registrations made at night, preliminary
registration of discharges or amendments to mortgages,
possession and administration of the vessel in case
of default, formalities of the sale of a vessel, and
clarification regarding the preliminary registration
fees. 30
Fiscal Laws
Under this heading we shall mention that
Titles II and IV of the Fiscal Code of the Republic
of Panama establish the basic fees for the registra
tion of ships and the annual and other taxes that
these must pay to the National Treasury. Greater
clarification as regards the tax regime applicable
to Panamanian vessels was obtained wi>th the prom
ulgation of Law No.4 of 24 February 1983, in which
we find a detail of all fees and payments to be made
by each vessel registered in the Panamanian fleet,
31
according to its tonnage and characteristics.
Although not of a fiscal nature, but because
they are promulgated under the authority vested in
the Ministry of Finance and Treasury to act as a
national maritime administration, in Annex I we in
clude a list of other legal provisions affecting
ship registration in Panama.
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Development Goals
Consonant with what we have stated should be
the goal of Panama's maritime administration, after
this brief overview of the system's legal framework
we are able to ascertain that there are really no
major legal changes required in order to improve the
performance of the fleet.

This serves to confirm our

contention that it is in the field of maritime safety
administration and employment of national seafarers
that SECNAVES should place greater emphasis during
the period 1986-2000.
As regards the developmental goal of achiev
ing a better maritime administration structure, in
order to fully comply with international safety and
pollution standards laid down by IMO, we must signal
at this stage that the current setup is basically
sound, as we have mentioned earlier, and that what
needs to be done is to introduce some new procedures
for carrying out duties related to casualty investi
gations and to perfect the new licensing and exami
nation system that will be formally inaugurated in
November 1985. (See Fig.4.)
The effect of introducing sound procedures
for conducting casualty investigations will be to
further improve the image of Panama as a serious
tonnage operator, a mesaure that will undoubtedly
gain the acceptance of banks and underwriters from
all over the world.

This should be done in order

to improve the safety record of the Panamanian fleet

DIRECTORATE GENERAL
OF CONSULAR & M A R IT I M E AFFAIRS
--------------------
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as a way of incentivating new registrations. The
overriding goal and concern of introducing the
casualty investigations procedures should remain,
however, the need to work actively to reduce the
loss of life and prevent the pollution of the ma
rine environment that are usually associated with
vessel casualties.
Other measures that could be introduced
by SECNAVES as a way of strengthening the Panama
nian maritime safety administration include mea
sures to exercise a more effective control over
classification societies authorized to issue cert
ificates under international conventions, the imp
rovement of surveys carried out under the Annual
Safety Inspection Program, and the fostering of
training efforts aimed at building up Panama's own
cadre of surveyors and maritime safety administra
tors. Reduced manning scales should also be studied.
At the national level, we believe it would
be convenient to begin considering the feasibility
of introducing port state control measures contem
plated under several IMO conventions.

In this re

gard, consideration must be given to the fact that,
as part of the duties it will be assuming when it
takes over the Panama Canal in 2000, Panama will be
required to have this type of operation in place in
order to cope with high traffic levels and the inc
reased possibility of marine casualties and pollution
incidents that this will undoubtedly engender.
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A final recommendation we wish to make for
implementing our strategic goal of developing Panama's
national maritime administration, taking advantage of
the fact that these are times of recession and low
activity, refers to the need to improve local shipping
regulations.

This could contemplate, for example,

the adoption of measures to control pollution coming
from ships transiting our territorial waters en route
to canal waters, collision regulations for areas with
high traffic density, and general surveillance mecha
nisms for the country's exclusive economic zone.

CHAPTER FIVE
THE NATIONAL PORTS
In order to understand ports development in
the Republic of Panama, it is necessary to underline
the fact that, despite the existence of numerous
natural harbours within the national territory, the
country has had scarce and only recent experience
in administering ports.
eral reasons.

This can be traced to sev

For one, we find that the two main

deepwater and international ports - Balboa and Cris
tobal -

were under complete US control until the

1977 Panama Canal Treaties came into force on 1 October
1979.

On the other hand, we find that the other two

important ports - Armuelles and Almirante - are under
a concession to the banana-exporting transnational
Chrigui Land Company. , This leaves us with a better
appreciation of the situation, if we only realize that
until some six years ago, only ports of minor traffic
were under complete Panamanian control.
It is against this background of a young and
inexperienced national portd administration that we
must evaluate contemporary ports development in Panama.
In evaluating this performance, moreover, special care
must be taken to account for the fact that, as per
canal treaty provisions, some aspects of the adminis64
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tration of Balboa and Cristobal are still handled
by the US; these include marine traffic control,
pilotage and defense in both canal and port waters.
The National Ports Authority (APN), as des
cribed earlier, is the Panamanian Government agency
in charge of the country's ports.

The institution

was created on 2 May 1974 by means of Law No. 42,
as the administrating agency of the national ports
network as per its stated functions and under the
guidance of its Board of Directors.

In this respect,

although it would seem advisable to change the cur
rent administration from a national to a private
one in the light of the successful examples we find
in European ports such as Rotterdam, according to
its enabling legislation the APN's main goals are:
to promote, guide and plan the governmental policies
aimed at developing any and all Panamanian ports;
to build, improve and preserve existing infrastruct
ure for public commercial use; and to exploit and
improve ports services offered by the Republic of
Panama.This means in effect that the APN undertakes
both developmental and operational functions in the
same house, a fact that somehow seems to constrain
the ability of its officials to work on both at the
same time and with the same degree of success. An
organization chart of the APN is available in Figure 5
At the time of this writing, seventeen ports
of varying sizes and types constitute Panama's ports
network.

At present, however, only Balboa and Cris-
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tobal are the subject of APN attention and this is
due to the fact that in the eyes of the Panamanian
administration, as expressed by APN Director General
Raul Brostella, "the most important thing is to
seek efficiency without sacrificing the historical
33
and nationalist value of Balboa and Cristobal."
Until early 1985, all APN actions for the dev
elopment of these two ports could be found within
the set of recommendations contained in the "Master
Plan for the Development of Balboa and Cristobal",
a study conducted in 1981 by the consulting consor
tium of LM/TAMS, at the request of the Panamanian
Government.

This Master Plan was prepared on the

basis of facts collected in 1979, when the ports
came under Panamanian control, and generally reflects
a situation characterized by outdated infrastructure.
After having closely followed the Master
Plan until the early part of this year, by mid-1985
the APN had decidedly altered its course of action
in favour a new and ambitious project called "Panama
Centreport".

The project as such was originally out

lined by Panama's President, Dr. Nicolas Ardito Barletta, in February 1985, when he created a national
committee for evaluating its potential and feasibil
ity .
As we have mentioned in our Strategy, "Panama
Centreport" is a positive initiative and a challenge
for Panama.

The ambitiousness of the project indi

cates, on the one hand, a governmental willigness
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to continue fostering Panama's maritime development
and, on the other, a welcome degree of sensitivity
towards technological developments in shipping. The
project is, in essence, another attempt to keep Pa
nama on the map of the world's principal trading
routes, a second non-marine alternative to the Pana34
ma Canal.
What Panama wants to develop is a transporta
tion alternative known as a land bridge, which arises
from the ease with which containers can be moved from
one mode of transport to another during the same voy
age.

Aware of the fact that in a transport system

consisting of nodes, links and flows, ports are a
particularly important node lying at the interface
between the sea and land links, Panamanian authorities
have conceived the project as a big container trans
shipment center formed by joining the existing port
infrastructures of Balboa and Cristobal via the trans
isthmian railroad and highway*systern, a feat only pos
sible thanks to the country's geography.

The service

is mainly aimed at benefitting the world's big intermodal operators and the round-the-world container
transport services.
As outlined up to now, the project seems worth
while pursuing.

In order to go ahead with it, however

Panama must solve some problems; 1) ensuring a good
and steady supply of customers; 2) obtaining the fi
nancing for reconditioning ports, roads and the na
tional railroad; 3) addressing the problems associated
with port labour; 4) updating legislation and the ad-
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ministrative procedures for handling customs, health
and other relevant matters; and generally fitting
the project within the broader ports and national
development schemes.
In order to guarantee, in a generic sense,
the steady flow of customers required to ensure an
adequate return on investments, we believe the key
issue will be the reinforcement of Panama's "healthy
climate". The "healthy climate" for Panama would mean
the fostering of maritime personnel, legislation,
development of complementary industries and the coun35
try's trade. Much as was done at the txme when Pana
ma was negotiating the Panama Canal treaties in the
1970's, it is necessary to show the maritime communi
ty today that the country is able to offer excellent
conditions for the development of infrastructure servies.

The framework for this "healthy climate" that

we speak about is provided by the national institu
tions; by laws and the way these laws are interpreted
in national courts; by_ the types and attractiveness
of incentives offered to both local and foreign entreprenuers; by the availability of well-trained and
English-speaking maritime personnel; and by a set of
well-defined and amply-publicized rules of the game.
It is our contention that the improvement of Panama's
healthy climate can well be the key to the success or
failure of the Panama Centreport project.
There is no need here to delve at length with
the complexities of obtaining financing for maritime
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infrastructure development in today's, world. In the
case of ports/ the main financial source for develop
ing countries has been the World Bank for Reconstruct
ion and Development. Yet, according to Dr. E.G. Frankel,
Port, Shipping and Aviation Adviser to the World Bank,
this institution has recently changed its lending prio
rities; from previous lending policies aimed at finan
cing new infrastructure, the bank has moved to a policy
more geared towards maintenance, repair and rehabili
tation schemes, technical assistance and training, and
the financing of only solid projects that meet existent
and future needs, reduce costs and improve the economy
of the borrowing country. Competition for World Bank
funds is thus increasing, while only US$ SOOmillion
are available for some 8 to 12 four-year projects. 36
Still another financial aspect that must be
considered in connection with the "Panama Centreport"
project is the possibility of having to resort to the
granting of private concessions in order to obtain
the necessary capital.

In the course of an informal

survey carried out by the author among leading econo
mists and shipping men, including Dr. H.L. Beth and
Dr. El A. Georgandopoulos, we were able to arrive at
the preliminary conclusion that it would not be in
the country's best interest to grant exclusive rights
for operation of the center to an individual firm or
consortium.

The reasoning behind this conclusion is

that there would be no guarantee, in the long run,
that the operator will forever want to stay in Panama;
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the fact that a government must always ensure that
its options remain open in order to supply the needs
of future clients; and the fact that in granting
exclusive rights to one operator the country will
lose at least part of its usual demand and it may
not be expected that the concessionaire will be pre
pared to accept higher compensating dues.
In our opinion, it is essential to deal with
the port labour aspects of the project at an early
stage in the planning process.

Containerization de

mands maximum cargo handling efficiency: the greater
the capital cost of the vessels using the ports (in
this case, the extremely expensive containerships),
the more important it is to reduce port turnround
and the greater is the penalty in terms of increased
costs because of deficient port services.

The use

of expensive equipment is another trademark of the
container revolution.

In the case of the Panamanian

project, laboujT-intensiveness should not be encouraged,
although we fully appreciate the political connotations
of unemployment.

Introducing more labour than is ne

cessary at the quayside is a very expensive way of
getting off the ground with the "Panama Centreport"
project.

Of course, the idea would be for the pro

ject to generate enough spin-off jobs in ancillary
industries so as to absorb any redundant or new la
bour .
Another aspect of the port labour issue is .
that of training.

Special and careful consideration

must be given to the training of selected personnel
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in port management and operations, perhaps through
the sponsoring of UNCTAD courses or of courses pre
pared by local experts in shipping and transport
economics.

There is a need for Panama to increase

national participation in the production and supply
of port and other services to shipping, but this can
only be effected via the training of personnel in
charge of lending those services.

Some examples of

more formal training in port activities can be found
in the port of Rotterdam and in the Port Workers'
Training Institute attached to the Arab Maritime Trans
port Academy of Alexandria, Egypt.
The question of updating legislation and in
troducing changes into documentary procedures for
customs, immigration, health and other national con
trol activities is of extreme importance.

Building

infrastructures that are extremely costly only to have
the trade flow stopped because some customs inspector
insists on opening a container is a development that
must avoided at all costs.

So many changes are being

introduced in this field that it is the subject of
many international gatherings of commercial lawyers
and many other international conventions and recommend
ations'.

The Chase Manhattan Bank is even in the pro

cess of putting into operation, by the end of this
year, a revolutionary system for the centralization
of documents used in usual transportation arrangements:
SEADOCS.

As outlined, the system will do much to imp

rove the problems associated with bills of lading and
normal trading.
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When we speak about fitting the "Panama Centreport" project within the overall framework of ports
and other development schemes, we are talking basic
ally about the second of the development goals we have
outlined in our Strategy for national maritime develop
ment in Panama.

We can never overemphasize the need

for project developers to keep always in mind the needs
of Panamanian importers and exporters and of the coun
try's foreign trade.

Although there is no organiza

tion such as a shippers' council or freight booking
bureau in Panama, port users can voice their opinions
via strong and reputable organizations such as the
Sindicato de Industriales de Panama (Panamanian Ind
ustrialists' Union -SIP) and the Asociacion de Usuarios de la Zona Libre de Colon (Association of Users
of the Free Zone of Colon - AU) and it can be said
that they have actively lobbied in favour of more ef
ficient and cheaper port services.
The role of Panamanian ports in the develop
ment of Panama's hinterland has not been adequately
contemplated thus far.

In a country where most of

the export industries are located outside the peri
meter of the principal urban centers, it would seem
wise to take a closer look at the possibility of imp
roving ports infrastructures in strategic areas of
the country.

This, in our opinion, could serve not

only the need of Panama's exports, but also the real
need that exists for the Panamanian hinterland to be
connected to the urban centers via as many links as
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possible, to ensure a more balanced regional and
social integration of the country.
From the point of view of importers and
exporters, as we have pointed out earlier, the
goal of developing other national ports could of
fer an alternative solution to some of the port
problems that they are currently facing and which,
we have every reason to believe, will probably be
aggravated and not solved by the new port develop
ment project for Balboa and Cristobal.

AU spokes

man Wellington Fung has indicated that 75 per cent
of all cargo handled in these two ports is somehow
connected to the operations of the Free Zone of
Colon, the second largest in the world after Hong
Kong.

Being the main users, Fung argues, they bear

the brunt of costs and of existing deficiencies in
port operations. 37
SIP President George Richa has pointed out
another angle of the problem:
We, the Panamanian industrialists, cannot export
competitively, since the cost of cargo handling
and freight rates weigh too heavily on the cost
of the Panamanian goods. Since the country fully
imports raw materials, products with an aggregate
national value receive a double impact....In the
last report submitted by the Caribbean Basin Ini
tiative, Panama appears as the country with the
greatest deficit in exchange with the United
States.38
Following along the lines of our argument, it
seems inevitable to ask how does the ports develop
ment scheme being espoused by the APN fit within the
national development strategy.

Obviously, in this

connection we must bear in mind that projected income
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and job figures do not give a complete picture of
the potential impact of the scheme on other national
maritime activities.
The impact of both the "Panama Centreport"
project and of other port developments in Panama
should be basically evaluated against the background
of both maritime ancillary industries and the Pana
ma Canal.

The former we shall discuss, albeit in a

brief manner, in a separate chapter.

Yet here we do

want to make a general comment regarding the impact
that ports development in Balboa and Cristobal'can
have on Canal traffic and revenue levels.

Panama is

treaty-bound to ensure the optimum operation of the
waterway, including the adoption of all measure ne
cessary to make it profitable and efficient. Ideally,
the implementation of the "Panama Centreport" project
should not take away tonnage from the canal, but ra
ther attract new tonnage towards its waters, possibly
the small feeder containerships that will be undoubt
edly making the trip from Panama to other areas of
Latin America and back, as well as the huge roundthe world containerships now in operation.
Before we conclude our consideration of ports
development for Panama's future, it is essential to
say a word of caution.

Although the "Panama Centre-

port" project is essentially a sound one and we would
expect to see it turn into a reality in the near fu
ture, we feel that there is one pre-requisite for
success that our policy-makers have seemingly over-
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looked: the cooperation or/ at least/ the tacit
acceptance of, the project on the part of other
Latin American states.

Ruling out the more ambi

tious possibility of integrating port services
at the regional level/ as seems sound in view of
the market limitations present in the countries
of the area/ this acceptance of the Panamanian
project must be forthcoming at some stage or ano
ther/ but preferably early on/ so as to avoid any
controversies that could throw the project into
trouble afterwards.
A final comment we wish to make is directly
related to policy-making in the container era. Here
we feel it is worth remembering Dr/ Frankel's dictum
that "containerization 'is obsolete" and that modern
port administrators must "move away from short-term
operations management to long-term strategic manage
ment.^^For Panama/ this means a thorough and firstever evaluation of the country's real and potential
needs/ as well as an analysis of the shipping scene
today and a projection of that situation into the
future.

Panamanian ports development/ and especially

the "Panama Centreport" project/ should not be an
exercise in "tagging along"/ just to end up with "more
of the same" type of ports infrastructure that every
other nation has or its trying to have, in a fruit
less effort to imitate ports developments in developed
nations that are now already a quarter of a century
old.

It would be worthwhile/ instead/ to try thinking

77
basically in tomorrow, such as the Japanese Transport
Ministry has done when preparing its plans for Japa
nese ports development in the next century.

We hope

that this chapter will have at least impressed this
fact upon our readers.

CHAPTER SIX
MARITIME ANCILLARY INDUSTRIES
It has been argued by many authors that, in
order to realize the full role, function and impact
of maritime activities on the national socio-economic
structure, it is necessary to review and study not
only key infrastructure and activities, but also the
host of related or support industries that are cond40
ucted in neighboring areas to serve them.
In the
case of Panama this seems specially important, since
we have earlier indicated the existence of more than
ten such industries that derive their existence from
the operations of the Panama Canal, the ports of Bal
boa and Cristobal, and the open registry fleet. Un
der this heading, then, we refer to the following:
(1) cargo handling,

(2) lighterage, (3) transporta

tion, (4) warehousing,

(5) the Free Zone of Colon,

(6) shiprepairs and shipbuilding, (7) ship stores
and supplies, (8) bunkering, (9) shipping operations
(10) ship agencies,

(11) freight forwarding, (12)

banking, (13) commerce, (14) telecommunications, and
(15) tourism.
For most of these activities, at we have ind
icated before, we have not been able to gather pre
cise figures or other hard performance indicators.
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Given the fact that, generally speaking, the total
export of goods and services (basically to the Canal
41
area) reaches around 40 per cent of the GDP, and
considering also the huge volume of traffic generat
ed by the ports and the canal, for which figures are
available herein, we are able to arrive at a better
idea of their relative importance within the frame
work of the national maritime sector. However, inde
pendently of the fact that data is not available,
there are some concepts regarding these industries
and activities and the way they can be improved with
in the framework of our strategy that we would like
to express here.
As regards cargo handling, lighterage, trans
portation, warehousing and freight forwarding, we
wish to underline two aspects that we consider cru
cial.

First we have the issue of personnel, and the

need to generally and quickly improve training, re
cruitment and management policies with the overall
aim of increasing productivity and streamlining port
operations.

Second, improvements in road, rail and

storage infrastructure and facilities should be inc
orporated into either ports or public works budgets,
mainly in the light of current work volumes and of
the projected expansion of port activity that will
be generated via the "Panama Centreport" project. An
area of special priority should be trucking, road
and rail haulage, which seems to be deficient today.
Both training and infrastructure development schemes
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should, in our opinion, reflect real needs and fea
sible growth projections, but should also address
the main issue of the need to respond to container
ization handling with greater efficiency.
The Free Zone of Colon is a major activity
in Panama, generating close to US$ 50 million annual
ly by way of salaries, taxes and charges levied on
companies operating there, and the import and proces
sing of raw materials for re-exportation^^Because
this activity has been severely hit by the economic
burden of Latin America's huge foreign debt and the
consequent reduction in the purchasing power of the
countries of the area, its main clients, great efforts
should be made to widen the market via: (1) a revision
of current legislation to strengthen investment pro
motion, (2) a revision of existing infrastructures
and facilities to ensure an adequate provision of ba
sic services and specially telecommunications and
optimum port operations,

(3) the setting aside of

areas for future expansion.
The shiprepairing industry we have discussed
earlier, although briefly, indicating that it is an
activity with what we consider to be an enormous po
tential for quick growth with minimum efforts. In
Panama there are currently two small shipbuilding
yards that work only on small craft and fishing ves
sels and which are now operating on a very low pro
file because of certain problems associated with
the fishing industry. These two yards, even though
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small/ could be revived if adequate measures are
taken to promote fishing activities, as has been
suggested in our Strategy for the fishing sector.
With respect to shiprepair yards, on the other hand,
we have already discussed the slow and steady growth
of ASBA over the past three years. Now we must men
tion the existence of another small yard at Samba
Bonita, on the Atlantic side, near Cristobal, which
can accomodate small ships, fishing vessels and
43
recereation craft. For these two yards we propose
the re-introduction of a previous clause contained
in the US Code of Federal Regulations, whereby ships
transiting the canal in ballast, just with the pur
pose of undertaking repairs at these facilities,
would be afforded special tolls treatment. This single
action, if adopted, could credibly augment the levels
of activity of both yards in a relatively short period
of time.
Activities relating to the transit of ships
through the Panama Canal, viz., ship stores and sup
plies, bunkering, shipping operations, ship agencies
and telecbmraiinlcations, are doing generally well,
except in the case of bunkering, where numerous com
plaints have been voiced by shipowners because of
the extremely high price of bunkers in Panama, despite
the fact that there is a refinery operating in Bahia
Las Minas, on the Atlantic coast of the isthmus. In
our opinion, attention should be given to the bunker
ing problem in the very short run since, considering
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the overall cost structure of shipping operations,
where bunkers command a preeminent role, Panama would
be best off by attempting to serve its shipowner clients
through a welcome reduction in the price of the bunkers
and fuel available in such a strategic location.

Also

in this connection, it must be pointed out that this
problem of the high cost of bunkers reduces Panama's
competitiveness vis-a-vis other neighboring ports and
could become a significant factor working against the
success of,the "Panama Centreport" project we are ad
vocating herein.
Also as part of the above group of industries,
we wish to mention the fact that Panama's brand new
shore radio station, PANAMA INTELMAR RADIO (HPP) is
an excellent addition to the existing network of topquality telecommunications services available in the
country and that the Panamanian authorities should
make every effort possible to advertise its existence
to the shipping community and specially to canal users.
Banking as a leading activity in Panama also
merits special mention here. Last July was the fif
teenth anniversary of Panama's highly successful bank
ing law (Cabinet Decree 237 of 16 July 1970) whereby
an international banking center was created in Panama.
As of the date of this writing, there are 122 banks
operating in Panama under three different licenses:
45
local, international and general.
Although these banks do not generally support
shipping or maritime services per se, their existence
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in the country does mean the presence of capital
and the possibility of making some of this capital
available for financing investments in maritimerelated activities.in the future.

The banking cen

ter does today lend support to Panama's great com
mercial and trading activities, a fact that indicates
that it is playing a significant role in the national
maritime development, inasfar as it sustains the vast
majority of the operations of the ancillary industries
under discussion in this chapter.

Jn a broader sense,

however, we wish to highlight the fact that the pres
ence of a highly sophisticated and international ind
ustry like banking, in Panama, presupposes the exist
ence of a favourable climate for foreign investments,
.one of the crucial elements of the "healthy climate"
that we consider vital to an integral development of
the national maritime sector. And this, in turn, is
another indicator of the' great possibilities that are
opening up for Pan.ama for an effective transfer of
technology aimed at improving competitiveness in the
highly complex, capital-intensive, international and
risky maritime world.
A final comment in this chapter refers to
tourism and commerce, two mainstays of Panamanian
economic activity.

With respect to both of them we

wish to emphasize the need to promote tourism and
attract to our cities and countryside the large amounts of passengers and crewmembers that transit
through Panama, specially the market of cruise ves-
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sels (in which Panama has, by the way, displaced Nor
way as the major flag).

Suggestions in this regard

could probably be best framed by hotel and tourist
experts, but we are sure that an improvement in the
transportation services to/from the port areas to
the cities/interior of Panama; the promotion of one/
half day sightseeing tours; the promotion of longer
package tours for visiting parts of the interior of
the country, especially islands and mountain regions
the education of the local public as to what tourism
is and means to our economy; and, generally speaking
a more commercially-oriented and exploited tourism
policy could place Panama among the top beneficia
ries of this industry worldwide.
Finally, in concluding this chapter, we are
inclined to state that, within the framework' of
the overall development strategy goals that we have
proposed in this dissertation, we attach great pos
sibilities for a relatively rapid growth to the act
ivities we have considered here under the heading
of maritime ancillary industries and that, provided
conditions for private investments remain as condu
cive as they have been up to now, these activities
should be the spearhead of progress in the field.

CHAPTER SEVEN
THE FISHING INDUSTRY
Although traditionally a fishing nation, per
haps due to the reduced internal market and the con
centration of exports around shrimp and a few select
ed fish species, the fishing industry in Panama has
grown, but not to the degree that one would have ex
pected in a country blessed with a very long coast
line and rich ocean waters.

As a matter of fact, it

should be noted here that the current performance of
this activity, although good when compared to other
maritime activities, could be greatly improved through
a better understanding of the potential awaiting the
country in this field.
In an earlier overview of the national mari
time sector of Panama we provided the key indicators
of the performance of the fishing industry. In it we
highlighted the existence of an export-oriented ind
ustry that represents about the same revenues as the
open registry fleet, a fact that often goes unnoticed.
In that overview we also indicted that the industry
is a major source of employment and that close to a
quarter of a million Panamanians depend on it, per
haps the best measure of its importance.
The main problems confronting Panama's fish
ing industry today can be characterized as follows:
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(1) the need to modernize fishing legislation and
to place it within the framework of UNCLOS III# and
(2) the need to work on ways to increase the catch
effort, diversify the fleet structure

and improve

its competitiveness in international markets, and
to broaden the local consumption habits and thus
widen the opportunities for domestic use of Panama's
ocean resources.
As it is currently organized, the fishing
industry in Panama has three main actors: the govern
ment, through the Directorate of Marine Resources;
the shipowners, through the National Association of
the Fishing Industry (ANDELAIPP); and fishermen,
through sveral unions.

These three parties work,

however, under rather harmonious conditions, perhaps
by virtue of the fact that the government agency in
charge of supervising fishing exploitation in Pana
ma has played a very succesful role as mediator and
as coordinator of the national efforts aimed at inccreasing the benefits

that the country derives from

the extensive resources it has in this area.
The industry has been bent, for more than
a year now, on the drafting of a new fishing law
that can allow Panama to benefit from its exclusive
economic zone and also increase the competitiveness
of the national industry with respect to other for
eign fleets and industries.^® Through the proposed
legislation, which has been revised at a very early
stage by the author, the industry endeavours to solve
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some of the key problems it confronts, and which can
be summarized as follows: (1) high fuel costs, (2)
increase in the cost of spare parts in the order of
25% in 1976 and 10% during the last four years; (3)
reduction in the catch and export volumes; and (5):
reduction in the value of exported volumes of fish
and shrimp.
From the above list we see that an item al
ready familiar to us with respect to ancillary ind
ustries reappears: the high cost of fuel.

This prob

lem, in our opinion, should be dealt with in the man
ner generally prescribed earlier, although we would
also favour the introduction of a special, temporary
subsidization measure to help fishing operators in
the short run, while more effective and healthier ways
are institutionalized via the proposed fishing legis
lation now in the making.

This temporary subsidy could

take one of several forms, although we would be inclin
ed to adopt some form of tax break.
On the subject of the fleet, as we have ex
plained

above, the main objective should be to revise

its overall performance, diversify it with respect to
ship types, in order to be able to catch other types
of fish, and then work hard on both catching and sel
ling the catch in carefully selected markets abroad.
Yet it must be borne in mind at all times that such a
strategy for the fleet can only be successful provided
the new legislation is able to correctly reflect the
potential opened up by UNCLOS III and to translate it
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into coherent, workable policies.
Finally, as regards local consumption of
fish products and the reduced size of the local mar
ket, we would want to underscore the point that it
would in Panama's best interest to tackle both these
aspects with great seriousness, in the light of the
varied and significant efforts being undertaken in
many nations to do the same, and to teach the popu
lation to eat fish, an excellent source of protein
and one that would be available to Panamanians ea
sily and cheaply, if exploited in a good way.

Here,

we find that the examples of research and .•advanced
development programs in fishing such as exist in Por
tugal and several other European and Asian countries
are worth studying.
A final comment we wish to make with respect
to the fishing industry in Panama refers to the need
to both reinforce the technical staff of the govern
ment agency in charge of supervising its development
and of the personnel working in the industry.

This

training component , as we have pointed out elsewhere
in our Strategy, assumes paramount importance in the
case of Panama's fishing industry, which needs to be
developed along the lines of modern technological
and scientific advances, if it is to ensure an ade
quate food supply, export revenues and technological
transfer .
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CHAPTER EIGHT
THE PANAMA CANAL
Exactly six years after the entry into force
of the Torrijos-Carter Treaties for the Panama Canal
of 1977, the "Eighth Marvel of the World" (See Fig
ure 6), its administration can proudly boast an ex
cellent operating condition, a high transit capacity,
a speedier transit service, an outstanding safety
record, and an overall harmonious working environment.
This is, in our opinion, an outstanding achievement
for the Panama Canal Commission (PCC)

mainly because

it signifies the stabilization of potentially detri
mental emotional conflicts and the consolidation of
conscientious efforts directed at implementing treaty
provisions in the best manner possible.
Despite a downturn in traffic levels during
1983 and 1984, basically due to worldwide recession
and the opening of the trans-isthmian oil pipeline,
the PCC has recently announced that there has been
a modest recovery in traffic levels during the first
half of 1985.

As seen in Table 3, traffic project

ions made by the administration for the years until
1987 are the following: 11,730 oceangoing transits
and US$303 million in tolls revenues in Fiscal Year
1985; 11,965 transits and US$310 million in tolls in
91
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Fiscal Year 1986; and 12,085 transits and US$315
million in tolls during Fiscal Year 1987.^"^
Under its current administrative set-up (see
Figure 7 ), and as per the provisions of the 1977
treaties on the Panama Canal, the mainstay of PCC
policy os to provide•efficient and economic transit
services to inernational shipping, while at the same
time meeting statutory requirements to work on a
break-even basis. In order to achieve this, until
now the PCC has invested heavily in canal maintenance,
improvement and training programs, all of which have
proven justifiable and successful thus far.

As regards

canal maintenance and improvements, it is worth noting
that thanks to to such programs, there has been a re
duction in the time spent by ships in canal waters,
a good indicator of canal efficiency.

An expensive,

long-term project now being studied is the widening
of the Culebra (Gaillard) Cut, the narrowest part of
the waterway, and also of the entrances to the canal,
which are now limited to 500 feet.

Several feasibi

lity studies and forecasts have also been commissioned,
as well as an independent analysis of the elasticity
AO
of tolls and of the demand structure until 2010.
Aside from t^e great emphasis that the canal
administration has placed on keeping the waterway in
optimum ope rating conditions and e ve n to try to make
it remain a viable option for transport users in the
future, special mention must be made here of the ef
forts undertaken also by the PCC in the field of
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training for Panamanians.

Consonant with treaty

spirit and specific provisions for the increased
participation of Panamanian nationals in all canal
activities, found in Article 1 of the Panama Canal
Treaty of 1977, the canal administration "is now
spending over US$5 million annually on training
programs designed to meet present and future needs
in both technical and administrative areas." As a
direct result of such efforts, "Panamanians now com
pose over 77 per cent of the canal's work force,
and Panamanian participation has increased signific
antly in the higher skilled jobs, including supervisory positions. 49 A very special development has been
the constant fostering of training programs for Marine
Bureau personnel, considered to be the most important
of all canal employees because they are responsible
for directing and executing the transit function.
In this connection, it is worth underlining
that, despite budgetary restrictions (since canal
users are the ones that pay for such services), the
PCC has invested heavily and consistently on the train
ing of Panamanians in the areas of tugboat mates and
masters and of canal pilots. In the latter category,
a special program entitled "Pilot Understudy Program"
was set up in July 1983 to accomodate Panamanian of
ficers that did not meet the usual requirements for
pilot apprentices,i.e ., to hold a Chief Mate or Master
ticket, because of problems with the placement of Pa
namanians that we have discussed earlier.

This pro- -
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gram already produced its first nine graduates, all
Panamanians, on 15 March 1985 50 , who have since joined
the pilot force to make the number of Panamanian pilots
rise to twenty-nine.
A more recent development that likewise serves
to strengthen PCC training efforts for marine person
nel is found in the recent formation of the Marine
Training Unit.

This unit will coordinate all PCC ef

forts to train new Panama Canal pilots, towboat mas
ters, marine engineers, seamen, launch operators and
deckhands.

The new unit is envisaged as an upward

mobility program, since it may serve also to train
the canal's future managers and senior administrators,
who will require solid knowledge of the canal's tech
nical and operational features.
After speaking succinctly about PCC adminis
tration and training programs, which we find to be
in an excellent overall situation, we wish now to
elaborate at some length on what we consider to be
the most crucial issue confronting, not only the wa
terway, but the Panamanian nation itself.

This is

the study of the marine and non-marine transportation
alternatives to the current Panama Canal, a study
mandated by the new treaties (themselves, which state
under Article XII that
1. The United States of America and the Republic
of Panama recognise that a sea-level canal may be
important for international navigation in the fu
ture. Consequently, during the duration of this
Treaty, both Parties commit themselves to study
jointly the feasibility of a sea-level canal in
the Republic of Panama, and in the event they det-
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ermine that such a waterway os necessary, they
shall negotiate terms, agreeable to both Parties,
for its construction. ...
3. The Republic of Panama grants to the United
States of America the right to add a third lane
of locks to the existing Panama Canal. This
right may be exercised at any time during the
duration of this Treaty, provided^that the United
States of America has delivered to the Republic
of Panama copies of the plans for such construct
ion. 51
Consideration of alternatives to the Panama
Canal is, in our opinion, not only a worthwhile but
also a necessary task.

It represents a mature way

of confronting technological change and of attempt
ing to cope with it for the benefit of the entire
nation. And, in a very big and essential way, it is
a way of letting Panamanians look at themselves, in
the historical perspective that we once spoke about
here, to revise the path trodden and to evaluate our
experience with the canal.

This issue, which is per

haps too close to our hearts still, and a memory too
recent to dispel, is one that must be resolved before
the country can effectively move ahead.

What I re

fer to here is the need for Panamanians to get away
from the mentality that Panama must eternally be
equated with a canal, and for them to understand that
what is ours, to keep and exploit and cherish forever,
is our country's enviable geographic position and the
unique narrowness and geological excellence of our
isthmus.

The latter is our resource, and the former

just a way of making use of that resource to benefit
our people and the world at large.
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Consistent with the treaty provisions that
we have previously quoted/ great progress has already
been made.

Beginning on 30 September 1982, when Pa

nama and the United States exchanged diplomatic notes
for the establishment of a joint preparatory commis
sion that would prepare the groundwork for the fea
sibility study of the alternatives to the Panama Ca
nal, studies within the commission have continued.
Also as part of the exchange, the two Parties agreed
to invite the Government of Japan to partake in the
work of the commission, in recognition of the fact
thht Japan is a major user of the waterway.
This past October, the Tripartite Commission
presented its final report to the governments of the
two Parties and to the government Japan, for their
consideration and approval.

In the report there is

a recommendation that the three countries proceed to
equally share the cost of the feasibility study that
is required, and which has been valued at US$20 mil
lion.

It is expected that the parties will announce

their decision on this important matter in the very
near future.
The alternatives to be evaluated range from
several proposals to modify the present canal to the
construction of a new sea-level waterway.

Not under

consideration under the scope of the feasibility study,
but left to the jurisdiction of the Panamanian autho
rities, are other non-marine alternatives to the canal,
including pipelines, transshipment centers, a land-
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bridge.

As we have pointed out, the Panamanian gov

ernment is already actively engaged in the considera
tion of such alternatives, specially in connection
with the "Panama Centreport" project.
The Sea-Level Canal Alternative
Many in the Republic of Panama and abroad,
specially in Japan, favour the construction of a
sea-level canal through the isthmus.

Advocates of

this alternative point out that the present canal
and its outdated system of locks will soon be obso
lete.

They also indicate that ship sizes have grown

over the past decades and that the costs for maint
aining and improving the canal are becoming too high.
Opponents of the sea-level alternative dis
tinguish several valid arguments against it. The first
of such arguments is the price tag: US$ 15 billion.
This amount appears to be, for them and for many of
the Panamanians, too heavy a burden to place on the
shoulders of a small nation of just two million inhab
itants.

Furthermore, current traffic levdls do not

seem to justify the investment and indeed signal a
doubtful recovery of the invested capital. Finally,
the possibility of joint financing by Panama, the
United States and Japan again raises questions of na
tional sovereignty which always complicate negotia
tions and partnership arrangements.
Economics of ship size are also used by the
opponents of the sea-level canal alternative. After
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the oil crisis, the- argue, the tendency towards
a "jumboization" of vessels has been detained,
probably forever.

The average ship size has been

stabilized and even tends to move downward, as builders
and operators favour fuel economy and other means
of reducing operating costs instead of economies via
an increase in the size of vessels.

Thus, ships

currently under construction are, on the average,
able to use the Panama Canal as it exists today or
with minor improvements. The only notable exception
are some Japanese vessels bordering the 150,000 dwt
upper limit for tankers.
Excavating a new sea-level canal is a funda
mental issue.

(See Figure 8). It has been estimated

that around 2.5 million cubic yards of material will
have to be removed with the use of not only advanced
excavating equipments, but also possibly through the
use of nuclear power.

Because of the many immigra

tion and ecological problems that such a possibility
entails, this is considered to be a major handicap
of the alterntive.
As it has been proposed, the sea-level canal
alternative has several other drawbacks. In this
sense, it is worht mentioning that its alleged unlim
ited capacity would not really exist., as there would
be a need for massive and expensive tidal gates. The
cities of Panama and Colon, the country's major popu
lation centers today, would suffer severe economic
dislocation as a result of being left out of the
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Fig. 8.
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sea-level canal's proposed route (Route 10). A min
imum of 30,000 people would have to be relocated in
order to prepare the 500 kms needed for the canal's
right of way. Almost 15 kms of dams would beirequired
to contain the waters of Gatun Lake during and after
construction; these dams would severely limit the
availability of water for the continued operations
of the current canalwhile the new one is being built.
And finally, both the Inter-American Highway and the
newly-built Arraijan-La Chorrera Highway would be
cut off by the sea-level waterway and this would mean
constructing two new bridges.
"The Panamanian Alternative"
A Panamanian engineer, Roberto Lopez-Fabrega,
of the engineering firm of Lppez, Moreno y Asociados,
S.A., has presented a new alternative to the Panama
Canal.

Because of its ingenuity and of the fact that

it has both a lower price tag and no unsurmountable
political, economic or ecological complications, the
so-called "Panamanian Alternative" is now being wide
ly discussed in Panama and favoured by many, ourselves
included.
"The Panamanian Alternative" can be summarized
as follows: that a new locks canal built around the
existing route is a better alternative than a sea-level
canal because it takes advantage of excavations already
made and also of the abundant rainfall in the Isthmus.
Proponent

.Lopez Fabrega has prepared a study, though
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not a formal feasibility study, to highlight the
main aspects of his proposal and to hint at the
feasibility of increasing the present canal's capa
city to accomodate.ships of up to 250,000 dwt (or
150,000 dwt with Phase I) through an expansion and
deepening of its channel, the addition of a third
set of locks, and the recycling of water from its
basin.

Figures 9, 10 and 11 illustrate the propo

sal more clearly.
According to engineer Lopez Fabrega, in
order to make the projectifeasible, it is necessary
to lower the elevation of Gatun Lake from 85 to 55
feet.

The Pedro Miguel Locks and the upper chamber

of the Gatun Locks would have to be eliminated. Other
major works involved in order to make the proposed
new locks canal include the widening and deepening
of the whole navigable channel? the construction of
Trinidad Dam; and the deviation of the Indio River
towards Lake Trinidad.

Yet the entire project can

be undertaken and completed, according to the propo
nent, without interrupting ships transits through
the current canal, except for a brief period in the
final stage, when the level of the lake is lowered.
Excavation works that must be undertaken for
the construction of the new locks canal involve some
800 million cubic yards of material, mostly of soft
consistency.

Ac omparison in excavation volumes is

available herein. According to Lopez Fabrega, the
sea-level canal would entail an excavation volume of
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Fig .9.

Source: Manfredo y Lopez Fabrega. "El Canal de Panama;
Alternativas para el Futuro. 1982.
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Fig. 10.

Source; Manfredo y. Lopez Fabrega. "El Canal de Panama;
Alternativas para el Futuro". 1982.
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3.1 times as great as that for ;'The Panamanian Alt
ernative " .
As far as costs are concerned, there is just
no comparison.

"The Panamanian Alternative" has been

estimated at a total cost of US$3.5 billion (in 1981
figures), divided along the following lines; US$ 2
billion for excavation, US$ 1 billion for locks, US$100
million for Trinidad Dam, US$100 million for deviating
the Indio River, and US$ 300 million in dams and other
expenses.
Finally, a general comparison between the two
principal alternatives clearly shows the advantages
of "The Panamanian Alternative".
quire no elaboration.

Cost advantages re

Some land could be recovered

if a new locks canal is built, vis-a-vis the need to
adjudicate an additional 500 kms

2

of land for the

sea-level canal, aside from lands for the relocation
of those inhabiting the adjudicated lands.

The extens

ive infrastructures that already exist could be used
for the locks canal alternative, whereas ifwould have
to be newly built in the case of the sea-level canal
option.

With "The Panamanian Alternative", current

employment levels could be maintained.

And, at the

end, there are no unpredictable and potentially dis
astrous ecological consequences to worry about.
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